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NOTES
EFFECT OF COURT DECREE OF SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE UPON Powvm OF
NLRB TO INVALMATE CONTRACT*
AFTER conducting a lengthy organization campaign in the face of brisk
Company resistance, the United Electrical and Radio Workers, a CIO affiliate,
succeeded in forming a local union among the employees of the National
Electric Products Corporation. Though the United claimed to represent
a majority of the employees, its requests for a conference were ignored by the
Company. Instead, the Company suddenly recognized an A. F. of L. affiliate,
the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, as sole bargaining
agent; actively assisted the subsequently formed local in enrolling employees;
and signed an agreement providing, in effect, for a closed shop.1 The United
immediately filed charges with the NLRB and, by calling a strike, effected
a complete shutdown of the plant. When the Company capitulated by agree-
ing to re-employ all the workers without discrimination, the Brotherhood
filed a bill in a federal district court for specific enforcement of its agree-
ment with the Company. The Company did not deny the validity of the
contract; instead, it answered that the plant could not possibly have been
re-opened without making concessions amounting to a breach of the contract.
The court ruled the answer insufficient, and decreed specific performance. 2
A few days after the Brotherhood had filed its bill in the federal court, the
NLRB issued a complaint, but hearings were not held until after the court
had handed down its decree. Nevertheless the Board invalidated the "dosed
shop" contract and ordered an election of representatives on the ground
that the contract itself was a discriminatory device prohibited by the Wagner
Act' and that it was consummated through the unfair labor practices of the
Company.4
*In the Matter of National Electric Products Corp., C-219 and R-241, 3 NLRB
No. 47 (Aug. 30, 1937).
1. The company agreed to employ only members of the Brotherhood or else to
check off union dues from those employees who did not join the Brotherhood.
2. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local Union B. 1073 et aL.
v. National Electric Products Corp., 1 PaREzrcF-HALL Ln. Sznv. footnote t 15642
(W. D. Pa. July 29, 1937).
3. 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U. S. C. § 151 (Supp. 1937). Section 8(3) pro-
vides that it shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer "by discrimination in
regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to
encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization."
4. In the Matter of National Electric Products Corp., C-219 and R-241, 3 NLRB
No. 47 (Aug. 30, 1937), (1937) 32 ILu. L. Rv. 353, (1937) 5 Uv. op Cm. L. RLv.
148, (1937) 6 I. J. A. BuLL. 52. The Brotherhood won the election by a vote of 790
to 675. In the Matter of National Electric Products Corp., R-241, 3 NLRB No. 47(b)
(Oct. 18, 1937). The United challenged 155 ballots, but later abandoned the contest,
at the same time reiterating its charges that the company had actively electioneered on
behalf of the Brotherhood. N. Y. Times, Sept. 28, 1937, p. 8, col. S. The company
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Contrary to the impression created by the attendant barrage of untempered
criticism,5 exercise of the Board's power to invalidate a contract0 tinder
these circumstances conforms clearly to accepted principles.7 The Board's
action did not violate any canon of the doctrine of res judicata. 8 Since the
validity of the contract was not considered in the case before the district
court, and since neither the CIO union nor the Board was a party to that
proceeding, the court decree could hardly foreclose Board action. Apart
from these technical considerations, the Board's assumption of jurisdiction
was undoubtedly also justified on broader grounds. An unfairly executed
labor contract acquires no aura of sanctity merely because a court has decreed
its specific performance. Ordinarily, the court would not even consider
whether the contract was consummated as a result of unfair labor practices,
particularly when the parties are anxious to conceal the circumstances of
its creation. Even if it were interested in this phase, a court is ill-equipped
to make the investigation necessary to ascertain these facts. And in any
case a court would seem to be precluded from making an initial determination
of the propriety of a labor contract, since the Board is vested with exclusive
jurisdiction over unfair labor practices. 9 Nevertheless, should a court pre-
sume to examine the validity of the contract, the Board would still be bound
to assert its exclusive jurisdiction. Otherwise, an employer could conven-
iently thwart the purposes of the National Labor Relations Act by securing
appealed from the District Court decree and petitioned for a review of the NLRB
order invalidating the contract. Both proceedings were pending before the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit, but no further action has been taken. Apparently the
election has rendered the issues moot. Communication to YALE LAw JOURNAL from
Defendant's attorney, March 7, 1938.
5. See, e.g., N. Y. Times, Sept. 2, 1937, p. 1, col. 6; N. Y. Herald-Tribune, Sept.
2, 1937, p. 8, col. 2.
6. It is assumed throughout this note that the Board has power to void contracts
in proper cases. This power has frequently been exercised when agreements have not
been made with the freely chosen representative of a majority of the enployees. See,
e.g., In the Matter of Stone Knitting Mills Co., R-200, R-201 and R-202, 3 NLRB
No. 22 (1937); In the Matter of Consolidated Edison Co. of N. Y., Inc., C-245,
4 NLRB No. 10 (1937); In the Matter of Lenox Shoe Co., Inc., C-255 and R-209,
4 NLRB No. 54 (1937). This note will consider whether in circumstances otherwise
appropriate a prior court decree of specific performance deprives the Board of its power
to invalidate contracts.
7. In an earlier case [In the Matter of Hill Bus Company, C-141, 2 NLRB 781
(1937)], the Board invalidated a closed-shop contract previously enforced by a state
equity court [Unreported chancery case affirmed in Hudson Bus Transportation Drivers'
Ass'n v. Hill Bus Co., 121 N. J. Eq. 582, 191 Atl. 763 (1937)].
8. For a statement of the principles of res judicata, see Von Moschzisker, Res
Judicata (1929) 38 YALE L. J. 299.
9. Section 10(a) of the National Labor Relations Act declares that the Board's
power to prevent any unfair labor practice is "exclusive, and shall not be affected by
any other means of adjustment or prevention that has been or may be established by
agreement, code, law or otherwise." As indicative of the disapproval with which the
Supreme Court views interference by a District Court with the NLRB, see Myers
v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., Ltd., 58 Sup. Ct. 459 (1938).
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court consecration of contracts hastily negotiated with unrepresentative but
friendly employee groups.
While the Board was justified in assuming jurisdiction, the institution
of proceedings before two dissimilar tribunals involves the employer in a
series of legal labyrinths from which no easy formula can extricate him.
Of course, if the conflicting claims of rival unions raise genuine doubts in
the employer's mind, he may at the outset avoid the possibility of being
subjected to inconsistent decrees by refusing to contract with a union until
it has been certified as the proper representative by the Board.' 0 But when
an employer either deliberately or unwittingly enters into a contract with
a possible minority union, he may be placed in the position of defending
actions both in a court and before the NLPB. Various alternatives are then
open to the court, acting upon its own motion or at the initiative of the
Board, employer, or rival union.
When a court has under consideration an action based upon a contract
whose validity under the Wagner Act will shortly be adjudicated by the
NLRB, several devices are available to avoid a conflict. Since the court
can not examine the validity of the contract in issue, the simplest would be
to relinquish jurisdiction completely in favor of the Board." This was the
course recently adopted by a Minnesota Federal District Court. An employer
sought to restrain a striking minority of his employees from interfering with
the contract he had made with the alleged majority on the ground that such
interference was unlawful under the Wagner Act. In declining jurisdiction,
the court pointed to the "anomalous situation" which would result if the
courts attempted to usurp the NLRB's function of determining whether or
not the union purporting to represent the majority of employees is appro-
priate for the purposes of collective bargaining.- That no case was pending
10. For the procedure when an employer consents to an election and agrees to
recognize the winner as the exclusive bargaining agents for all his employees, see
Certifying Bargaining Agents: A Case Study (1937) 1 LAm. REE. REs,. 90. The New
York Labor Relations Act [N. Y. Laws 1937, c. 443, art. 20 § 705.3] provides for an
investigation of a controversy concerning representation upon petition by the employer.
See Comment (1938) 51 HAnv. L. REv. 722, 725.
11. Federal courts have surrendered jurisdiction to the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission for the sake of uniformity of decision and the exercise of expert opinion. Texas
& Pacific Ry. v. American Tie Co., 234 U. S. 138 (1914) ; Standard Oil Co. v. United
States, 283 U. S. 235 (1931). But the remedy afforded by the I. C. C. is just as com-
plete as that offered by a district court. Cf. also Pennsylvania v. Williams, 294 U. S.
176 (1935) (Federal District Court should have relinquished jurisdiction over receiver-
ship suit when state had set up agency to administer assets of insolvent building and
loan associations); In the Matter of Genesee Valley Gas Co., Inc., File No. 52-1
SEC Release No. 981 (Jan. 24, 1938, Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935)
(Fact that current accounting practices investigation by New York Public Service
Commission might render unfeasible reorganization plan given as one of grounds for
SEC's withholding approval of plan) ; American Brake Shoe & Foundry Co. v. Pitts-
burgh Rys., 270 Fed. 812 (W,. D. Pa. 1918).
12. Lund v. Woodenware Workers Union, 19 F. Supp. 607 (D. MHnn. 1937).
The court refused to decide whether the Wagner Act proscribed picketing by a minority
union even when a contract was made with a union certified by the Board.
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before the Board at the time especially emphasizes the responsibility of the
court when one is. But while the result may be satisfactory when the em-
ployer seeks to restrain some of his employees from tortious interference
with a labor contract of dubious validity, adherence to such a precedent
when a union sues for specific performance of d bona fide labor contract13
would seriously impair one of labor's important remedies. 4 For this reason,
the court would perhaps do better to avoid a conflict with the Board by
staying its own action until the determination of the Board proceedings
involving the contract rather than by relinquishing jurisdiction entirely.1"
The granting of a stay in this situation would be in accordance with the
relevant standards traditionally considered in a private law case. 10 While
none of these criteria are in themselves controlling, in order to exercise its
discretion in this manner the court generally must be satisfied that the
eventual decree of the other court would have a binding effect. Although
the parties and issues in these two actions are not so identical as to make
one of the suits superfluous, it is clear that the ultimate issue is the legality
of the contract; and should this be decided adversely, the plaintiff in the
court action would be precluded from obtaining a decree of specific per-
formance even though it was not a party to the case before the Board.11
Ordinarily, courts also consider whether the action sought to be preferred
was commenced before the one sought to be stayed, whether the interests
of the stayed party will be adequately represented in the other case, and
whether the stayed party will be otherwise prejudiced. If priority is deemed
significant in this type of situation, the court should consider whether filing
13. The Lund case might be distinguished from the instant case on the ground
that the cause of action there was based on the Wagner Act while the right to specific
performance exists independently of that Act.
14. The growing tendency specifically to enforce collective agreements at the behest
of a union is discussed in Simpson, Fifty Years of American Equity (1936) 50 HARV.
L. REv. 171, 200 et seq. See also Comment (1938) 51 HARv. L. REv. 520, 525, et seq.
15. This assumes, of course, that at least preliminary Board proceedings have already
been started.
16. See (1937) 46 YALn L. J. 897.
17. Especially when the validity of a contract is in issue, it may plausibly be
argued that, like the decision of a probate court as to the validity of a will [United
States v. Napoleon, 296 Fed. 811 (C. C. A. 5th, 1924)], the proceedings before the
Board are in rem, binding "all the world." Even without pursuing this line of argu-
ment, the plaintiff union would be bound where, as in the instant case, it was made a
party to the proceedings, although it did not appear. And even if a party in the stayed
action is not a party to the preferred action, a stay may be issued where the preferred
tribunal has undertaken to determine the validity of the contract in issue. Holt v.
Uvalde Co., 269 S. W. 73 (Tex. Comm. App. 1935). These arguments are most
persuasive when the Board's order becomes res judicata upon affirmation by the
Circuit Court, either upon application of the Board for enforcement or upon petition
for review by the employer. But even without a review, the Board's decision might
be analogized to an unreviewed BTA decision which, under certain circumstances, is
res judicata in subsequent court proceedings. Greenbaum v. United States, 17 F.
Supp. 83 (Ct. Cl. 1936); Griswold, Res Judicala in Federal Tax Cases (1937) 46 YAL8
L. J. 1320, especially 1326, n. 33.
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of charges before the Board' s or issuance of the formal complaint by the
Board' 9 preceded the preliminary steps in the court action. It would seem,
however, that the time differential should not rate as a substantial factor,2 0
especially since the rights of the stayed party will be adequately protected
if that party is allowed to intervene in the Board proceedings.2 ' If the
plaintiff complains of suffering from the delay, it may be pointed out that
where required by the public interest - here embodied in the Wagner Act
-equitable relief may be withheld or a stay granted even though private
rights may thereby be impairedY- A final persuasive factor in inducing a
court to grant a stay is the possibility that the Board decision may render
subsequent court action unnecessary, thus obviating unnecessary expendi-
tures of time and money, and avoiding a multiplicity of suits against one
defendant. Nevertheless, the court might be reluctant to relinquish juris-
diction or to grant a stay since the plaintiff may well be injured by the
delay. In view of this possibility, a future conflict could best be avoided
by so framing the decree enforcing an untested labor contract as to retain
the cause for further action in the event of an NLRB decision on the con-
tract.2
18. In the principal case, the bill of complaint in the District Court was filed by
the Brotherhood a few days prior to the date of service of the Board's complaint, but
considerably later than the date when charges were filed before the Board by the
United.
19. The precedents do not indicate whether an action commences with the filing
of charges or the issuance of a formal complaint. See (1926) 74 Uznv. oF PA. L RrV.
506. The date of issuing a complaint might seem preferable since the Regional Director,
subject to an appeal to the Board, may refuse to issue a complaint on the charges
filed. NATIONAL LABOR RE.ATioNs BoARD, RuLEs AND REGcu.LTxIons (1937) art. II,
§§ 5, 9. But cf. Louisville & N. R.R. v. Sloss-Sheffield Co., 269 U. S. 217 (1925)
(informal complaint to ICC in reparation suit sufficient to toll running of Statute of
Limitations although formal complaint not filed until after statutory period); Louis-
ville & N. R. Co. v. Dickerson, 191 Fed. 705 (C. C. A. 6th, 1911).
20. Other considerations may outweigh mere priority in time. Oppenheimer v.
Carabaya Rubber & Navigation Co., 145 App. Div. 830, 130 N. Y. Supp. 537 (Ist
Dep't 1911); Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Marzec, 146 Misc. 26, 262 N. Y. Supp. 558
(Sup. Ct. 1932); cf. Levy v. Pacific Eastern Corp., 154 Misc. 655, 277 N. Y. Supp.
659 (Sup. Ct. 1935).
21. In the instant case the A. F. of L. union was served with copies of the com-
plaint and notice of hearing, and the Board's opinion indicated that intervention would
have been granted, had it been sought. See NATizAL LAroR RnExTzos BoADm, Ruzms
AND REGULATIONs (1937) art. II, § 19; art. III, §4; art. VII, § 1. The Board has
occasionally denied petitions for intervention by unions, but only under circumstances
clearly distinguishable from those in the principal case. See, e.g., In the Matter of Star
Pub. Co., 4 NLRB No. 69 (1937).
22. Virginian Ry. Co. v. System Federation No. 40, 300 U. S. 515 (1937) (in-
junction); Landis v. North American Co., 299 U. S. 248 (1935) (stay), (1937) 46
YALE L. J. 897.
23. See the form of order in Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line, 211 U. S. 210 (1903).
See McCL'rTocK, Egurry (1936) §28; 1 Pomxmoy, Eourr, JulusrauDslc9 (4th ed.
1918) §§ 115, 116; Survel Realty Corp. v. Brooklyn Edison Co., 139 Misc. 113, 246
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Whichever of these procedures is adopted- relinquishment of jurisdiction,
stay of proceedings, or conditional decree-the court may act either on its
own motion 24 or upon that of the employer, union, or Board. Thus a peti-
tion might be directed to the court by an employer acting in good faith and
anxious to avoid the expense and uncertainty of defending two suits.2 5 More
likely, however, would be intervention by either the NLRB or the rival
union, or perhaps appearance in the capacity of amici curiae.20 But there
would still remain the problem of bringing the other proceedings to the
official attention of the court.27 While the court might find it difficult to
take judicial notice of the proceedings,2 it could, of course, listen to evidence
from the defendant, and from the interveners 29 or amici curiae as well.30
The instant case, however, illustrates the difficulty besetting an employer
when none of these devices are utilized. Since the Board may be called
upon to invalidate a contract whose specific performance has been decreed
by a court, the employer may be ordered to obey two conflicting decrees.
Though perhaps primarily responsible for the confusion, the employer may
escape from the dilemma without further flouting the purposes of the Wagner
Act. It is possible, of course, that the election of representatives will favor
the group with whom he has negotiated, 1 thereby presumably terminating
these legal complications. If, however, the election results unfavorably for
the employer's choice, a review of the Board order might be secured either
N. Y. Supp. 409 (Sup. Ct. 1928); Town of West Rutland v. Rutland Ry., Light &
Power Co., 98 Vt. 379, 127 AtI. 883 (1925).
24. Latham v. Tombs, 32 Tex. Civ. App. 270, 73 S. W. 1060 (1903); cf. Patitucci
v. Gerhardt, 206 Wis. 358, 363, 240 N. W. 385, 387 (1932).
25. Stays are customarily granted at the request of a party called upon to defend
two or more suits. Landis v. North American Company, 299 U. S. 248 (1936), (1937)
46 YALE L. J. 897.
26. An amicus curiae can suggest to the court action which the court may take
of its own motion [Stewart v. Herten, 125 Neb. 210, 249 N. W. 552 (1933); Jackson
v. Birk, 84 S. W. (2d) 332 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935)], even as to matters going to the
court's jurisdiction. Helmbright v. Gebelein, Inc., 19 F. Supp. 621 (D. Md. 1937);
Muskogee Gas Co. v. Hiskell, 38 Okla. 358, 132 Pac. 1098 (1913); Flinn v. Krotz,
293 S. W. 625 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927).
27. Although the court itself would be unlikely to undertake the burden of inquir-
ing into the existence of Board proceedings [5 WI0Momx, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) § 2579],
any of the above-mentioned parties might bring them to its attention. Of course, there
is just a bare possibility that a speedy collusive suit will be so veiled in secrecy as to
prevent other parties from taking action before a decree. But such a judgment might
be vacated later by motion of a third party. FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS (5th ed. 1925) § 258.
28. It is said that a court will usually not notice any other legal proceedings than
those immediately before it. 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (2d. ed. 1923) § 2579. But see cases
cited note 39, infra.
29. An intervener has the privileges of a regular party. See Grand Rapids v. Con-
sumers' Power Co., 216 Mich. 409, 414, 185 N. W. 852, 854 (1921).
30. The Claveresk, 264 Fed. 276 (C. C. A. 2d, 1920); In re Perry, 83 Ind. App.
456, 148 N. E. 163, (1925) ; Irwin v. Armuth, 129 Ind. 340, 28 N. E. 702, (1891).
31. This actually happened in the instant case. See note 4, supra.
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by the employer's appeal to the Circuit Court 32 or by awaiting a petition
for enforcement by the Board.m While neither procedure would be likely
to yield a reversal when, as here, the Board's power is clear, affirmance of
the Board order would considerably clarify his position. Since courts will
not ordinarily attempt to enforce a decree of specific performance when a
contract has subsequently become illegal, 34 the employer could then disregard
the court decree.35 Should the court nevertheless attempt to enforce its
decree, such action could be contested by appealing a citation for contempt.
But in view of the risk of a contempt commitment, it would be more prudent
for the employer to take some affirmative action. The safest course would
probably lie in a petition to the district court to vacate the decree,30 supple-
mented by a notice of appeal3 7 from the original decree.ms Then, in the
unlikely event that the court denied the motion to vacate, the Circuit Court
would probably set aside the original decree.3 9 As a last resort, in case both
the appeal period and term time have elapsed 40 without alteration of the
32. Authorized by Sec. 10(f), 49 STAT. 453 (1935), 29 U.S.C. §160(a) (Supp.
1936). Defendant adopted this procedure in the principal case. See note 4, supra.
The employer might also petition the Circuit Court for a stay of the election. In the
principal case, the Company's request for a stay of the election was refused by the
Circuit Court, 1 LAB. Rn.. REaP. 35 (1937).
33. Section 10(e) 49 STAT. 455 (1935), 29 U. S.C. § 160(e) (Supp. 1937).
34. See 1 F.EMAN, JUDGMENTS (5th ed. 1925) § 253 and cases cited.
35. The illegality of the contract would be established by the Circuit Court decision.
Sec. 10(e) of the Wagner Act provides that, subject to review, the jurisdiction of the
Circuit Court "shall be exclusive and its judgment and decree shall be final." Even if
no attempt were made to review the Board decision, it might be regarded as res judicata,
thereby rendering inoperative the district court decree. See note 17, mspra.
36. Before the close of the term a court may vacate equity decrees and judgments
at law for any reason, provided that it does not act arbitrarily. See FEmEMAr, JUDG-
MENTS (5th ed. 1925) §§ 195, 212.
37. The Company also appealed the district court decree [reported in 1 Pn.nncz-
HALL LAB. mV. 1 15642]. See note 4, stpra. An appeal from a federal district court
decree must be taken within three months. 43 STAT. 940 (1925) 28 U. S. C. § 230,
(1927). Protracted Board proceedings should not, however, prevent prompt action by
the employer, for notice of appeal could always be filed within the required time if
the outcome were at all uncertain.
38. Denial of the motion to vacate would not be considered an "appealable order."
Bensen v. United States, 93 F. (2d) 749 (C. C A. 9th, 1937).
39. When changes in fact or law-including court decisions-occur since the entry
of the judgment appealed from, they may be brought to the appellate court's attention
by affidavit, concession of counsel, or other satisfactory evidence, if they affect the
disposition of the case. California v. San Pablo & T. R. Co., 149 U. S. 303 (1893);
St. Louis Southwestern Ry. v. Board of Directors, 32 F. (2d) 124 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929).
The appellate court may then dispose of the case in any manner it deems just. Watts,
Watts & Co. v. Unione Austriaca di Naviganzione, 248 U. S. 9 (1918); Mutual Life
Insurance Co. of N. Y. v. Lipp, 28 F. (2d) 863 (C. C. A. 9th, 1928). The result
would not be affected if the specific performance decree came before a state court or
a circuit court other than the one where the Board order was in issue.
40. Except for reasons inapplicable here, a district court may not vacate its decree
after the expiration of the term in which it was made. Farmers' and Merchants' Bank
of Phoenix v. Arizona Mut. Savings and Loan Ass'n, 220 Fed. 1 (C. C. A. 9th, 1915).
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original decree, the employer might petition for a bill of review, 41 or move
the district court to stay enforcement of the decree.
42
DEPLETION ALLOWANCES IN TAXATION OF INCOME DERIVED FROM
OIL ROYALTIES AND OIL PAYMENTS*
IN THE growth of income tax administration, divergent methods of ex-
empting that amount of gross income representing return of capital invest-
ment have evolved. Where gross receipts flow from a contract right to future
contingent payments not closely allied with extraction of minerals, the tech-
nique has generally been to treat the periodic payments received as entirely
a return of capital until the original investment has been recovered in full,
and thereafter, as income.1 With few exceptions,2 there has been no attempt
to apportion each payment between capital and income. On the other hand,
when gross income is derived from the exhaustion of mineral resources,
Congress has granted depletion allowances3 on the theory that the value of
41. This would be granted only if the subsequent decision of the Board could be
categorized as newly discovered evidence. Cf. Obear-Nester Glass Co. v. Hartford-
Empire Co., 61 F. (2d) 31 (C. C.A. 8th, 1932).
42. Since the order would stay all proceedings under the decree, it would have
the same practical effect as a motion to vacate. Cf. Barnett Foundry Co. v. Iron Works
Co., 85 N. J. Eq. 359, 96 Atl. 490 (Ch. 1915).
The employer might ask the district court for a declaratory judgment to relieve
him from the insecurity of awaiting the plaintiff's petition for enforcement of the orig-
inal decree. See BoRcHAR, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS (1934) 313, 320, 410 and cases
there cited. But this might savor too much of collateral attack upon a valid judgment,
*Comm'r of Int. Rev. v. Laird, 91 F. (2d) 498 (C. C. A. 5th, 1937).
1. Burnet v. Logan, 283 U. S. 404 (1931); X-2 Cum. BuL. 221 (1931). The
Board of Tax Appeals has held that the rule of the Logan case will be applied only
where the return of capital is especially hazardous. Brown, 26 B.T.A. 781, aft'd,
69 F. (2d) 863 (C.C.A. 5th, 1934).
2. In several cases lower federal courts have apportioned receipts from contract
rights to future contingent payments between capital and income by use of either of
two methods: (1) each payment is discounted back to the date the contract was pur-
chased and the resulting figure is a capital return, and the remainder of the payment,
taxable income; (2) the portion of each payment representing interest on the unre-
turned capital is taxable income, and the remainder is a capital return. 1 PAUL AND
MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION (1934) §5.34. Annuities for many
years were tax free until the entire cost had been returned, but in 1934 Congress
provided that prior to full capital return, a portion of each payment equal to 3% of
the aggregate cost of the contract should be taxable as income. 48 STAT. 687 (1934),
26 U. S. C. § 22(b) (2) (Supp. 1936). See Tyler and Ohl, The Revenue Act of 1934
(1935) 83 U. OF PA. L. REv. 607, 632.
3. The first provision for depletion allowances appeared in 1913. 38 STAT. 167
(1913), Rev. Act of 1913, §§ B, G(b). But substantially full depletion was not pro-
vided until 1916. 39 STAT. 759 (1916), Rev. Act of 1916, §§ 5(a) eighth (a), 12(b)
second (b). For a collection and discussion of the depletion provisions of all subsequent
Rev. Acts, see 2 PAUL AND MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION (1934)
§ 21.02 et seq.
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each unit recovered represents in part a return of capital investment equal
to the value of the unit of mineral in place, and in part income representing
the increment of value added by the process of severance.4
Computation of depletion allowances at first was accomplished by dividing
the capital investment by the estimated recoverable units of mineral and de-
ducting the resulting figure, multiplied by the number of units recovered
in the taxable period, from the gross income for that period. In the case
of oil and gas reserves, however, the migratory nature of the mineral pre-
cludes a satisfactory estimate of recoverable units." Consequently, Congress
departed from the normal practice of measuring capital return by cost, and
provided for annual depletion deductions measured by an arbitrary figure
of 2 7Y% of the gross income derived from the extraction of oil or gas.1
The result is that in the event of unexpectedly prolonged productivity of a
well, the taxpayer is often returned not only his capital investment but also
additional sums representing the excess of the actual value of the oil reserves
over and above the purchase price.8 Though Congress has deemed the ad-
ministrative simplicity gained by percentage depletion more valuable than
the revenue lost by holding tax exempt this possible increment of gross in-
come over and above capital, it has not departed from the fundamental theory
of capital return, as shown by its refusal to tax capital where percentage
depletion returns less than actual capital cost.0 In any event, each unit of
gross income from mineral operations is treated as if composed in part of
taxable income and in part of capital.
4. Signal Gasoline Corp. v. Comm'r of Int. Rev., 77 F. (2d) 728, 730 (C. C. A.
9th, 1935) ; (1937) 47 Ymx L J. 278.
5. 381 C. C. H. 1938 Fed. Tax Serv. ff 245.01; HoLSXEs, FEDaAA. TAx. (6th
ed. 1925) § 664, n. 33. In the case of land purchased prior to March 1, 1913, fair
market value as of that date and not cost is the basis for the allowance. 39 STAT. 759
(1916), Rev. Act of 1916, §§ 5(a) eighth (a), 12(b) second (b); and all subsequent
Rev. Acts. The Act of 1918 added the provision that as to oil discovered subsequent
to March 1, 1913, depletion allowances to the discoverer should be based not on cost
or value as of March 1, 1913, but on fair market value on the date of discovery or
thirty days thereafter. This special subsidy to discoverers of oil was omitted from the
Act of 1926 and all subsequent acts though it was retained as to discoverers of mines.
For a discussion of cost computation of depletion allowances, see Comment (1934)
43 YALE L. J. 466.
6. GLAssmnm, OIL AND GAs LE.sm AND RoYALrns (1935) § 5.
7. 44 STAT. 16 (1926), Rev. Act of 1926 §204(e)(2); and all subsequent Rev.
Acts. That the attainment of administrative simplicity was the sole purpose behind the
departure from the cost basis, see Comm'r of Int. Rev. v. Fleming, 82 F. (2d) 324,
326 (C.C.A. 5th, 1936).
8. Tyler and Ohl, The Revenue Act of x934 (1935) 83 U. oF PA. L REv. 607,
647, Both percentage computation and the substitution of discovery value for cost have
been severely criticized as subsidizing a small class of property owners by allowing
for exemption of more than cost from income taxation. 78 CONG. REC. 1775 (1934);
N. Y. Times, Dec. 16, 1933, p. 28, col 1.
9. Mountain Producers! Corp., 34 B.T.A. 409 (1936). All of the Rev. Acts
providing for percentage depletion also provide that in no case shall the allowrance be
less than if it were computed on the unit cost basis. See note 7, jupra.
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A recent case reveals the necessity for a judicial survey of the borderline
between situations appropriate for the application of these two divergent
methods of recognizing a capital return. A taxpayer, as beneficiary under
a will, received an undivided part interest in an estate including both a
right to receive royalties reserved in leases of oil lands and a right to receive
oil payments reserved in the sale of oil lands.10 For federal estate tax pur-
poses the Commissioner of Internal Revenue estimated the value of each of
these rights to contingent future payments. The Commissioner later assessed
an income tax against the beneficiary upon royalties and oil payments which
accrued to him subsequent to his acquisition of the rights from which those
payments flowed." The Board of Tax Appeals upheld the taxpayer's con-
tention that the royalties and oil payments constitute a return of capital
and not income until they equal-the estate tax evaluations of the taxpayer's
respective legacies.12 The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
affirmed as to the oil payments, but ruled that the royalties were income
immediately taxable, with allowance of deductions only for depletion.' 3
.. Oil royalties constitute payments of a percentage of the oil produced or
its value which are to continue until exhaustion of the oil reserves or earlier
-termination of the lease.14 At first it was held that ownership in fee alone
-constituted a depletable interest 15 and that a right to royalties arose from a
contract resembling an annuity, which was not closely enough associated with
the oil reserves to amount to a depletable interest in them;1O capital was
therefore returned in full before levy of the income tax rather than pro rated
under the concept of depletion. But judicial recognition of a depletable in-
terest was rapidly broadened to include any legal estate in the oil lands, 7
and recently the Supreme Court has taken the further step of including any
"economic interest" in the oil in place.'8 Though the term "economic inter-
10. For purposes of income taxation, one who takes as a beneficiary is considered
in the position of an assignee of the estate, and the estimated value of his legacy is the
measure of the beneficiary's capital investment. Burnet v. Logan, 283 U. S. 404, 412
(1931); cf. Fink v. Comm'r of Int. Rev., 76 F. (2d) 335 (C. C. A. 10th, 1935). The
fact that the rights to royalties and oil payments were acquired by the taxpayer by
inheritance rather than by out-of-pocket investment consequently has no bearing upon
the point at issue, and the estate tax, which was levied upon the right to testamentary
transfer and not on the property itself [Shukert v. Allen, 273 U. S. 545, 546 (1927)],
has no bearing upon the question of income taxation in the instant case.
11. For the methods used by the Commissioner in estimating depletion allowances,
see note 7, supra, as to the royalties, and note 33, infra, as to the oil payments.
12. Transcript of Record No. 8413, 21, Conm'r of Int. Rev. v. Laird, 91 F. (2d)
498 (C. C.A. Sth, 1937).
13. Comm'r of Int. Rev. v. Laird, 91 F. (2d) 498 (C. C. A. 5th, 1937).
14. 2 THORNrON, O. Am GAS (Willis' ed. 1932) § 363; see (1935) 45 YALE
L. J. 363.
15. IX-2 Cum. BuLL. 214 (1930), as amended by X-2 CUM. BuUr. 221 (1931);
cf. Burnet v. Logan, 283 U. S. 404 (1931).
16. Weiss v. Mohawk Mining Co., 264 Fed. 502 (C. C. A. 6th, 1920), The decision
has been explained as a'misinterpretation of United States v. Biwabik Co., 247 U. S.
116 (1918). See HoLMEs, FEDERAL TAXES (6th ed. 1925) 1143.
17. 2 PAUL AND MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION (Supp. 1937) § 21.18.
18.- Palmer v. Bender, 287 U. S. 551 (1933).
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est" has caused considerable confusion,10 there is no longer any doubt that
it includes the right to royalties. 20 Thus the Court in the instant case was
consistent with precedent in holding that the capital investment in the right
to royalties should be returned through depletion allowances.
Oil payments flow from a right to a stipulated sum to be paid out of
production. Like royalties, they constitute a percentage of production and
cease upon an unexpected exhaustion of mineral reserves, but in the absence
of prior exhaustion the right to receive these payments continues until the
stipulated suni has accrued, and is not terminated by the expiration of an
agreed peribd of time as is the right to royalties.2' This limitation by amount
instead of time would not seem material enough to warrant a distinction in
the treatment of oil payments and royalties. The courts have been perturbed,
however, by the fact that oil payments are generally created by instruments
purporting to "sell" the taxpayer's entire right, title, and interest in the
property whereas royalties usually accompany a "lease" of the taxpayer's
interest. To allow depletion on oil payments runs counter to the concept
of a sale as a single transaction giving rise to an immediate gain or lossF
and the courts have been slow to accept the idea that one who has parted
with his entire legal interest in mineral reserves by sale may still retain a
relationship to those reserves that is sufficiently allied with production to
warrant depletion allowances.23 This confusion has continued in spite of
the Supreme Court's decision in Palmer v. Bender24 which would seem to
make questions of title immaterial by defining depletable interest as syn-
onymous with "economic interest." The Supreme Court has recently settled
the problem by adopting the view that the assignor does not convey that
portion of the oil which he is to receive by way of oil payments.2 By this
theory,-0 depletion of oil payments is allowed without injury to the concept
of a sale.
19. See 2 PAUL AND M=fENs, LAW OF FEDERAL INc0.!Em TAXArio (Supp. 1937)
§ 21.18; (1937) 47 YA.E L. J. 278.
20. Royalties are depletable whether received as rent by a lessor [New Creek
Coal Co. v. Lederer, 295 Fed. 433 (C.C. A. 3d, 1924); III-I Cur. Bu.. 192 (1924)],
as payment by a lessee-assignor [XII-2 Cum. BULL. 198 (1933)]; or as overriding
royalties in payment for services or other consideration. Smith v. U. S., 17 F. Supp.
353 (S. D. W. Va. 1936); (1937) 23 VA. L. REV. 837.
21. See Comm'r of Int. Rev. v. Fleming, 82 F. (2d) 324, 325 (C. C.A. 5th, 1936);
GLASSM IRE, OIL AND GAS LEASES AND ROYALTIES (1935) 160.
22. Profits from an outright sale of oil lands are taxed not as income but as a
capital gain. Dixon v. United States, 13 F. Supp. 620 (D. NVyo. 1935); Fritz, 28
B.T.A. 408 (1933); Macon Oil and Gas Co., 23 B.T.A. 54 (1931).
23. Comar Oil Co. v. Burnet, 64 F. (2d) 965, 968 (C. C. A. 8th, 1933).
24. 287 U. S. 551 (1933).
25. Thomas v. Perkins, 301 U. S. 655 (1937). Direct authority for the allovwance
of depletion on oil payments is by no means lacking. Comm'r of Int. Rev. v. Fleming,
82 F. (2d) 324 (C. C. A. 5th, 1936); Comm'r of Int. Rev. v. Williams, 82 F. (2d)
328 (C. C. A. 5th, 1936); Alexander v. Continental Petroleum Co., 63 F. (2d) 927
(C. C. A. 10th, 1933); Comer of Int. Rev. v. Jones, 82 F. (2d) 329 (C. C. A. 5th,
1936).
26. The quantity of oil reserved by the assignor from the operation of the conveyance
is that amount which when removed at intervals over a period of years will equal in
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If, as is customary, the contract giving rise to the oil payments also pro-
vides for the payment of a cash amount, or "cash bonus," as part of the con-
sideration, then the cash bonus is deemed the purchase price of that portion
of oil which is not retained by the assignor, and with reference to it capital
is returned not by depletion but in a lump sum as is the rule in taxing
capital gain.27 If the transaction can be brought into the category of a lease,
then the courts are not troubled by the sale concept and the cash bonus is
considered not as purchase money but as advance royalties and therefore
subject to depletion. 28 Indeed, if a small royalty is provided for in the con-
tract of sale in addition to a cash bonus and oil payments, the presence of
that royalty will bring the cash bonus under the depletion concept. 20 Thus
the Supreme Court seems not to have departed completely from the con-
ceptual approach based upon notions of title which the Palmer case was
thought to have divorced from depletion. 0
Despite the confusion as to cash bonuses, the latest authority is that the
recipient of oil payments has a depletable interest in the oil in place.3' The
Court in the instant case recognized this rule and held that the taxpayer
was entitled to depletion allowances on the oil payments. The Court went
further, however, and stated -that before any of the payments become taxable
at all, the taxpayer's capital investment should first be returned in toto. Thus,
the taxpayer seems to be accorded a return of his entire capital investment
first under the method customarily applied to a contract right to future con-
tingent payments, and a second time under the system of depletion allowances.
Certainly there can be no justification for returning the same capital twice.
2
total value a stated sum. Under this rationale, as the market value of oil fluctuates,
the quantity of oil to which the assignor has retained title must change correspondingly.
27. Comm'r of Int. Rev. v. Fleming, 82 F. (2d) 324 (C. C. A. 5th, 1936); Laird,
35 B. T. A. 75 (1936); Simms, 28 B. T. A. 988 (1933); ef. Thomas v. Perkins, 301
U. S. 655 (1937). But see Elbe Oil Land Development Co. v. Comm'r of Int. Rev.,
91 F. (2d) 127, 130 (C. C.A. 9th, 1937). In computing the capital gain, cost must
be allocated between the interest sold for the cash bonus and the retained right to oil
payments. It would seem that the cost of the interest sold is that portion of the original
cost which bears the same ratio to the entire original cost as the cash bonus bears to
the sum of the cash bonus and the present value of the right to oil payments.
28. Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U. S. 103 (1933); Murphy Oil Co. v. Burnet, 287
U. S. 299 (1933); Palmer v. Bender, 287 U. S. 551 (1933). For the method of com-
puting depletion allowances on cash bonuses, see U. S. Treas. Reg. 94, Art. 23(m)-10
(1936). When percentage depletion is applied to both bonus and royalties the simplicity
of tax administration originally sought by Congress through the percentage method of
computation is attained. By introducing technical property distinctions, the courts have
sacrificed this simplicity and gained nothing since capital is ultimately returned either
through depletion or through a cost deduction in computing the tax on capital gain.
29. Palmer v. Bender, 287 U. S. 551 (1933).
30. See Ross, Depletion of Oil Leases (1936) 14 TAX MAG. 323.
31. See note 25, supra.
32. In recomputing the taxpayer's assessment under the mandate of the principal
case, the Board of Tax Appeals realized the inconsistency of granting a return of the
same capital by two methods. Laird, 36 B. T. A., mem. op., Nov. 18, 1937. The estate
was entitled to $37,722 in oil payments. The estate tax evaluation of this right was
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Once it was decided that depletion allowances should be granted, it would
seem to follow that depletion is the exclusive method by which capital may
be returned.3 3 Apparently the Court failed to recognize that depletion allow-
ances are provided for the sole purpose of returning capital.as
It may be argued that because of the unpredictable factors determining
the ultimate productivity of oil wells,3 5 it is unfair to force the taxpayer to
risk a cessation of royalties or oil payments before his capital has been re-
covered, and therefore no income should be taxable until that recovery has
occurred a6 However, if a loss is suffered through an unexpected exhaustion
of oil reserves, the taxpayer will generally be in a position to avail himself
of an ordinary loss deduction.37 His only risk is that his income at the time
of the loss will not be sufficiently large to enable him to take full advantage
of the deduction. Compensation for this risk is usually found in the possi-
bility that much more than actual capital investment may be saved free from
taxation by the arbitrary percentage depletion allowances.33 Moreover, the
$22,633. The payments for the year in question totalled $27,090. The Board deducted
$22,633 (full cost) from the sum of $27,090, but refused depletion allowances on the
remaining $4,457, saying that the Circuit Court above had not been clear as to the
treatment of this sum. Provided that the remaining $10,632 of oil payments are received
and depletion allowances granted as ordered, the estate will receive a further unwar-
ranted return of capital amounting to $2,923.
33. If the depletion concept had been employed exclusively, the taxpayer undoubt-
edly would have resorted to the unit-cost method, for percentage depletion would return
less than the original cost of $22,633. See note 9, supra. Difficulties in application
would arise since the total number of units recoverable by the taxpayer is dependent
not only upon the uncertain longevity of production, but als o upon the ever-changing
market value of oil. To prorate cost to units, it would be necessary either arbitrarily
to fix an estimated average market value or to consider the dollars of the payment
instead of the barrels of oil represented by those dollars as the units for the purpose
of the calculation. This latter method, which seems to have been used by the Com-
missioner in the principal case, would only be applicable when it is reasonably certain
that the oil reserves will not be exhausted prior to completion of the contract payments.
In the principal case the Commissioner allowed deductions of 60% of the payment in
question on the basis that the estate tax evaluation of the right to payments was set
at 60% of the total contracted payments. In view, of the contingencies involved this
method seems a reasonable compromise between accuracy and simplicity of administra-
tion. However, it points to an inconsistency on the part of the Commissioner who seems
to have taken into account the possible exhaustion of reserves before receipt of the
total oil payments as well as postponement of enjoyment in reaching the estate tax
evaluation, but to have ignored the first of these two factors in computing the depletion
allowance.
34. Comm'r of Int. Rev. v. Fleming, 82 F. (2d) 324, 326 (C. C. A. 5th, 1936);
2 PAUL A-D MEENs, LAw OF FEDMAx INcouE TANATIOiN (Supp. 1937) § 21.01.
35. See note 6, supra.
36. Burnet v. Logan, 283 U. S. 404, at 412 (1931).
37. Simms Petroleum Co., 28 B. T. A. 1107 (1933), aff'd, 74 F. (2d) 561 (C. C. A.
2d, 1935); United Oil Co., 25 B.T.A. 101 (1932); see Witherspoon Oil Co., 34
B.T.A. 1130, 1137 (1936).
38. This element of compensation for the risk borne is present in the instant case
as to the royalties but not as to the oil payments, for depletion allowance as to the
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element of risk to the taxpayer that during early tax periods he will be
subjected to income taxation on the proceeds of a venture which may ulti-
mately result in a loss instead of a gain would seem to be far outweighed
by the advantages of a system of taxation which will produce ascertainable
revenue payable at regular intervals.30
DISBARMENT OF ATTORNEY RETAINED TO DEFEND AGAINST
CRIMES WHEN AND IF COMMITTED*
DESPITE increasingly rigid requirements which must be met by those enter-
ing the practice of law, changing social conditions have rendered maintenance
of the traditional standards of professional conduct of the American Bar
increasingly difficult.' In metropolitan areas, the impact of a highly com-
petitive profession, a litigious population, and a society too preoccupied to
be bothered with abstract morality for the little man has tended to place
upon the courts the ultimate burden of supervising the conduct of the at-
torneys who practice before them. To meet these trends the courts have
found it necessary to expand their inherent disciplinary power, always jeal-
ously guarded.2 Thus, although several earlier decisions indicated that at-
torneys could not be disbarred for other than statutory grounds,3 the more
recent cases are virtually unanimous in holding that statutory definitions of
misconduct are not exclusive. 4 Similarly, while it has long been established
latter would have to be computed by the unit-cost instead of the percentage method.
See note 33, supra. However, in cases where cost represents an actual investment, the
courts have not been swayed to deviate from the application of depletion methods of
capital return because of the absence of this element of compensation for the taxpayer's
risk; an investment which represents a windfall in the nature of a legacy certainly
deserves no more protection than an out-of-pocket investment.
39. Burnet v. Sanford and Brooks Co., 282 U. S. 359, 365 (1931.); Fawsett v.
Comm'r of Int. Rev., 63 F. (2d) 445 (C. C. A. 7th, 1933) ; 1 PAUL AND MEmTENS, LAW
oF FEDERMA INcOME TAXATioN (1934) § 11.04.
*In re Davis, 252 App. Div. 591, 299 N. Y. Supp. 632 (1937); In re Disbarment
Proceedings, 321 Pa. 81, 184 AtL. 59 (1936), and In re Salus, 321 Pa. 106, 184 Atl. 70
(1936).
1. See generally GisNET, A LAWYER TELLS THE TRUTH (1931); Scuawssim,
LAwYERS MUST EAT (1933).
2. That appellate courts have inherent power to discipline attorneys is clearly
established. State v. Cannon, 206 Wis. 374, 240 N. W. 441 (1932); 2 TuoRN. oN,
ATTORNEYS AT LAW (1914) § 758.
3. In re Collins, 147 Cal. 8, 81 Pac. 220 (1905); Ex parte Smith, 28 Ind. 47
(1867); Kane v. Haywood, 66 N. C. 1 (1872); In re Eaton, 4 N. D. 514, 62 N. W.
597 (1895).
4. In re Bailey, 30 Ariz. 407, 248 Pac. 29 (1926) ; State v. Laughlin, 10 Mo. App.
1 (1881) ; see Wood v. State, 45 Ga. App. 783, 789, 165 S. E. 908, 911 (1932) ; In re
Zirinsky, 234 App. Div. 470, 474, 255 N. Y. Supp. 492, 496 (1932).
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that an offense need not be indictable to warrant disbarment,5 early cases
intimated that only professional misconduct would be considered;G today
non-professional misconduct often results in striking an attorney's name
from the rolls.7 A conveniently vague formula, the concept of an "offense
involving moral turpitude," has been developed to give the courts a wide
latitude in their disciplinary action.8 And certain courts have recently as-
sumed the function of investigating a general practice in search of professional
misconduct,9 along with their more commonly invoked power of investigating
a specific charge of misconduct to decide whether a particular individual
should be disbarred. In the course of this development, a series of increas-
ingly acute problems has arisen with concomitant attempts at reform. Courts,
bar associations, and legislatures have successively dealt with the contro-
versy over the contingent fee,' with the emergence of the divorce specialist,"x
and with the many-sided problem of the "ambulance chaser."'-' The latest
5. United States v. Porter, 27 Fed. Cas. No. 16,072 (C. C. D. C. 1812); Baker
v. Commonwealth, 73 Ky. 592 (1874). Contra: In re Stryker, 1 Wheeler Cr. Cases
330 (N. Y. 1816).
6. State v. Weber, 141 La. 448, 75 So. 111 (1917); In re Stryker, 1 Wheeler
Cr. Cases 330 (N. Y. 1816) ; State v. Byrkett, 3 Ohio N. P. 28 (1294) ; In re Dickens,
67 Pa. 169 (1870).
7. Ex parte Wall, 107 U. S. 265 (1882) (inciting riot); Grievance Committee
Hartford County Bar Ass'n v. Broder, 112 Conn. 269, 152 At. 292 (1930) (adultery) ;
In re Wellcome, 23 Mont. 450, 58 Pac. 47 (1899) (political bribe) ; Matter of Percy,
36 N. Y. 651 (1867) (perjury-bad reputation); cf. People v. Hoenig, 317 111. 390,
148 N. E. 299 (1925) (fraud).
8. For an analysis of judicial efforts to clarify the meaning of "moral turpitude"
and a plea for a more concrete formula, see Bradway, Moral Turpithde As the Criterion
of Offenses tlht Justify Disbarment (1935) 24 CALiF. L Rnv. 9.
9. People ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin, 248 N. Y. 465, 162 N. E. 487 (1928); Rubin
v. State, 194 Wis. 207, 216 N. W. 513 (1927); (1928) 13 Cown. I Q. 438; (1928)
13 IiN. L. REv. 62.
10. The contingent fee was illegal and unenforceable at common law. In re
Bleakly, 5 Paige 311 (N. Y. 1835). It is now legalized in 46 states [WOOD, FEE Co;-
TaAcrs oF LAwyms (1936) § 16 and cases cited] subject to the generally recognized
exception that a contract to obtain a divorce for a percentage of the alimony is void
on grounds of public policy. Id., § 92 and cases cited. The question is by no means
a dead issue. A reform bill to restrict contingent fees to 33 1/3% was killed by the
lawyers of the Judiciary Committee in the New York legislature in 1929. Very recently
the Association of the Bar of the City of New York adopted a recommendation that
the judiciary law be amended to permit control of contingent fees by the courts. N.Y.
Times, Feb. 24, 1938, p. 4, col. 4.
11. See ScHLossER, LAwYERs MusT EAT (1933) 94 c seq.
12. Ambulance chasing was the evil which led to the decision that courts had in-
herent power to investigate a general practice to see whether misconduct vas prevalent.
See cases cited note 9, supra. See ScHwssaa, L Arms Musr ET (1933) 117 ct seq.
Disbarment for ambulance chasing is of course frequent. See, e.g., Chreste v. Comm.,
178 Ky. 311, 198 S.W. 929 (1917); In re Newell, 174 App. Div. 94, 160 N.Y. Supp.
275 (1916). For legislation making ambulance chasing grounds for disbarment, see
M nN. STAT. (fason, Supp. 1936) § 5687-5; Nmw YORx PENAL Law § 274; Vis. STAT.
(1935) c. 256, § 29.
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product of our social development is the lawyer who is more than a shyster-
the lawyer who has achieved the full dignity and status of the racketeer.
In the course of a search for information concerning Dutch Schultz while
he was a fugitive from justice, federal agents obtained evidence by tapping
wires which implicated his attorney in the "numbers" or "policy" racket.
In a disbarment proceeding instituted by the Bar Association of the City of
New York, the referee rejected this evidence on the ground that the New
York rule of admissibility of evidence procured by tapping wires13 was ap-
plicable only to criminal prosecutions,' 4 and held that the charges were not
sustained. The Appellate Division admitted the evidence, stated that the
charges could be proved by circumstantial evidence,' 0 and concluded that
the latter clearly showed a retainer or agreement to defend all the "numbers"
men who might run afoul of the law. The court held that such a retainer to
defend persons for offenses thereafter to be committed was in effect aiding
and abetting the perpetration of crime and was conduct meriting disbarment. 10
The same problem recently arose in Pennsylvania and received similar
treatment. After an investigation instituted by the Court of Common Pleas
of Philadelphia County and conducted by a committee of the Philadelphia
Bar Association, several attorneys involved in the "numbers" racket were
disbarred. The Supreme Court affirmed this action, holding that attorneys
who agreed in advance to defend persons when and if arrested for criminal
offenses forfeited all right to practice law.
1
Although these two cases are apparently without direct precedent, there
are others which point in the same general direction. It was early held that
a retainer to defend a person in the event of criminal prosecution in the
13. People v. Defore, 242 N. Y. 13, 150 N. E. 585 (1926); People v. McDonald,
177 App. Div. 806, 165 N. Y. Supp. 41 (1917). Evidence obtained by wire tapping is
no longer admissible in the federal courts. Nardone v. United States, 58 Sup. Ct. 275
(1937), distinguishing Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
14. The general rule is that disbarment is a civil action. In re Herrmann, 175
App. Div. 310, 161 N. Y. Supp. 977 (1916); see Ex parte Wall, 107 U. S. 265, 288
(1882) ; 2 TuomToN, ATToRNEYS AT LAW (1914) § 867. A few courts, however,
have held it to be in the nature of a criminal proceeding. Bar Assoc. of* San Francisco
v. Goldman, 53 Cal. App. 42, 199 Pac. 836 (1921) ; Buhler v. Trick, 195 Ind. 190, 144
N. E. 840 (1924); In re Boluss, 28 Mich. 507 (1874). And a fair-sized minority of
courts view a disbarment proceeding as neither civil nor criminal but msi generis. State
v. Kaufman, 202 Iowa 157, 209 N. W. 417 (1926); In re Richards, 333 Mo. 907, 63
S. W. (2d) 672 (1933).
15. The formula for the amount of evidence required in a disbarment proceeding
depends upon the court's interpretation of the nature of the action. Thus, a preponder-
ance of the evidence is usually said to be sufficient; but where the action is considered
to be of a criminal nature, the defending attorney has the benefit of all reasonable
doubt; and where the action is considered to be sui generis, it is generally stated that
the evidence must be clear and convincing. See cases cited supra note 14. See (1921)
9 CALrF. L. Ray. 484.
16. In re Davis, 252 App. Div. 591, 299 N. Y. Supp. 632 (1937).
17. In re Disbarment Proceedings, 321 Pa. 81, 184 At. 59 (1936), and In re
Salus, 321 Pa. 106, 184 AtI. 70 (1936).
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future was void and unenforceable on grounds of public policy, 8 but appar-
ently at that time the attorney involved was not even censured. Similarly,
an agreement to collect debts which might in the future be resisted as gam-
bling debts has been declared unenforceable as an attempt to reap the fruits
of crime,' 9 but again the attorney was not reprimanded. In a more recent
case, attorneys who agreed to defend all members of a mercantile association
against all actions civil or criminal, which might be brought against them
were censured, but not disbarred.20 And, of course, attorneys actually con-
victed of crime,21 or guilty of obstructing the enforcement and administration
of the law2 have always been subject to strict disciplinary action.
One can hardly quarrel with the result in either of the principal cases,
but, divorced from the facts, the decision that the taking of a retainer to
defend against possible future criminal charges justifies disbarment has fur-
ther implications. It raises the question of the status of the attorney who
has a retainer with a business organization, if the latter subsequently becomes
liable to criminal prosecution under such legislation as the Securities E_x-.
change Act of 1934 and the Robinson-Patman Act. It is hardly to be
expected, however, that any court would apply the rule strictly in such a
situation. The distinction which most readily suggests itself is that where
the enterp-ise is legitimate and advance intention to commit infractions of
the law is either lacking or unknown to the attorney retained, no disciplinary
action against the attorney is warranted. Thus the court in both the principal
cases was careful to distinguish the general retainer by organizations engaged
in legitimate business; intent to aid and guide a combination of persons
formed solely for the purpose of engaging in crime was the ultimate basis
for disbarment. In fact, the rule of the instant cases may be viewed as a
convenient substitute for the conviction of the attorney as a co-conspirator
or accessory before the fact, from which disbarment would follow as a matter
of course. Whereas sufficient evidence for conviction is often extremely
difficult to obtain,2 only a preponderance of the evidence is required to
effect a disbarment in New York and many other states.2 4 Moreover, the
18. Bowman v. Phillips, 41 Kan. 364, 21 Pac. 230 (1889).
19. Delahunty v. Canfield, 118 App. Div. 883, 103 N. Y. Supp. 939 (1907).
20. In re Gill, 104 Wash. 160, 176 Pac. 11 (1918).
21. State v. Stringfellow, 128 La. 463, 54 So. 943 (1911); In re McCarthy, 42
Mfich. 71, 51 N. W. 963 (1879) ; In re Singer, 233 App. Div. 467, 254 N. Y. Supp. 371
(1931). It is generally held that an executive pardon after conviction does not offset
the court's inherent power to disbar for the offense. See (1937) 21 Mimn. L Rxv. 837.
22. People v. Barrios, 237 Ill. 527, 86 N. E. 1075 (1909); In re Feinstein, 245
App. Div. 740, 280 N. Y. Supp. 267 (1935); Ex torte Miller, 37 Ore. 304, 60 Pac.
999 (1900).
23. In the Pennsylvania case the court pointed out that none of the "bankers" or
leaders of the racket had been arrested, or their identity even disclosed, at the time
the disbarment proceeding occurred. In the New York case, however, the attorney
involved, apparently himself the real leader of the racket, had been indicted when the
disbarment proceeding took place. He was recently arrested and held for extradition
in Philadelphia. N. Y. Times, Feb. 3, 1938, p. 1, col. 1.
24. In re Herrmann, 175 App. Div. 310, 161 N. Y. Supp. 977 (1916). See note
14 mpra. See 5 WIGmOBE, EVmENcE, (2d ed. 1923) § 2498(2).
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courts relax the rigid and firmly-established safeguards available to the
accused in a criminal trial, on the ground that a disbarment proceeding is
an extra-judicial action aimed not so much at punishing the individual at-
torney as at purging the profession.
25
RIGHT OF CUSTOMER OF INSOLVENT BANK TO SET OFF His DEPOSIT AGAINST
His OBLIGATIONS PLEDGED AS COLLATERAL SECURITY*
THE INSOLVENCY of a commercial bank leaves in its wake numerous set-
off problems. Most common but least troublesome are those growing out of
direct dealings between customer and bank.' The amount which may be re-
covered by the receiver or proved by the customer in that situation is deter-
mined, as before sequestration, by the balance of the current account.2 A
similar result is reached where one or more of the opposing obligations repre-
sent independent causes of action acquired from third parties.3 While the
principle of equal distribution of the assets among the general creditors is
never repudiated, this form of preference to the depositor has customarily
received statutory and judicial approval as a convenient method of settling
accounts between debtor and creditor.4 But the problem is not so easily solved
when some interest of a third party is intertwined with the banker-customer
relationship, as when a customer's note has been pledged either to the bank
by a third party, or to a third party by the bank, as collateral security for
the pledgor's indebtedness.5 Additional complications are then introduced by
25. In re Hettrick, 203 App. Div. 512, 514, 197 N. Y. Supp. 6, 8 (1922) ; In re Lav
Ass'n of Philadelphia, 312 Pa. 555, 563, 167 Atl. 579, 582 (1933). The distinction
seems unreal, for the moral and economic effects of disbarment upon the disbarred
attorney may be no less severe than penalties imposed upon the convicted criminal.
*Meeker v. Halsey, 87 F. (2d) 299 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937) ; Red Bank Building and
Loan Ass'n v. Ailing, 20 F. Supp. 474 (D. N. J. 1937) ; Willing v. Lupin Building and
Loan Ass'n, 20 F. Supp. 774 (E. D. Pa. 1937); Powell v. Hood, ex rel. United Bank
and Trust Co., 211 N. C. 137, 189 S. E. 483 (1937); Perring v. Baltimore Trust Corp.,
171 Md. 618, 190 At. 516 (1937).
1. These problems are fully discussed in Moore and Sussman, The Current Account
and Set-Offs between an Insolvent Bank and its Customer (1932) 41 YAux L. J. 1109.
For a history of the doctrine of set-off, see authorities cited in Comment (1932) 41
YALE L. J. 881, at 882, n. 2.
2. Scott v. Armstrong, 146 U. S. 499 (1892); Moore and Sussman, s/pra note 1,
at 1118 et seq.
3. Except where the customer may be indemnified from another source for his pay-
ment on the instrument. E.g., an endorser is not entitled to set off where the maker is
solvent [Bank of United States v. Braveman, 259 N. Y. 65, 181 N. E. 50 (1932), (1932)
2 BXLN. L. REv. 122; (1932) 32 Col. L. REv. 1063]; nor a surety where the principal
is solvent [Hutchinson Coal Co. et al. v. Miller, 20 F. Supp. 718 (N. D. W. Va. 1937);
Comment (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 881].
4. See Moore and Sussman, supra note 1.
5. This note is confined to these situations. General set-off principles are equally
applicable here. As long as the bank's obligation to the customer is already due, most
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the convergence of general set-off principles with the legal consequences of
pledging a note as collateral security.
The relevant principles regulating realization upon notes pledged as col-
lateral security may be briefly stated.0 Upon maturity of the debt, if the
pledgor fails to redeem the collateral by payment, the pledgee may sue in his
own name for the entire amount due upon the note.7 If the amount of the
collateral does not exceed the debt, the pledgee may retain the entire proceeds;
but if the collateral is worth more than the debt, he must return the surplus
to the pledgor.8
A simple set of facts forms the framework for the series of situations in
which the issue of set-off arises in connection with the depositor's note held
by the receiver for the bank as pledgee. A borrower from a bank pledges a
note of a customer of the bank as collateral security for the loan. Upon
sequestration of the bank's assets, the receiver, unable to collect from the
borrower, sues the maker-customer on the collateral note. The maker claims
the right to set off his deposit balance in the bank. If the collateral note does
not exceed the pledgor's debt, the depositor is clearly entitled to a set-off.0
courts will not bar a set-off merely because the customer's obligations may not yet have
matured at the time of sequestration. Upham v. Bramwell, 105 Ore. 597, 209 Pac. 100
(1922), 25 A. L. R. 938 (1923) ; Clark, Set-off it Cases of Inmature Claims in Insolvency
and Receivership (1920) 34 HAnv. L. REv. 178; (1932) 80 U. oF PA L REv. 420. Relative
rights are determined as of the time of sequestration [Dakin v. Bayly, 290 U. S. 143,
90 A. L. R. 999 (1933); Gerseta Corp. v. Equitable Trust Co., 241 N. Y. 418, 150
N. E. 501 (1926); Sloss v. Taylor, 182 Ark. 1031, 34 S.W. (2d) 231 (1931)], and the
receiver stands in the shoes of the insolvent, being subject to all the set-offs, counter-
claims, liens and encumbrances valid against the insolvent. Advance Exchange Bank
v. Baldwin, 31 S. IV. (2d) 96 (Mo. 1930) ; Bank of Woodward v. Robertson, 111 Oda.
58, 238 Pac. 844 (1925).
6. A variety of nebulous legal theories have been advanced to rationalize the simple
practical result: (1) The pledgee is said to be the legal owner to the ezx'tent of the debt
but with only a qualified interest and a special title, any remainder belonging to the
pledgor. See Pearce v. Rice, 142 U. S. 28, 38 (1891); Lewis v. Smith, 289 S. IV,
1018, 1019 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927). (2) The pledgee may be considered the legal owner
of all the collateral, holding it in trust for himself to the extent of the debt and for the
pledgor for the remainder. But, until the principal obligation is paid, only the pledgee
may sue on the collateral note. See In re Thompson, 276 Fed. 313, 317 (NV. D. Pa.
1921) ; Ball-Thrash & Co., v. McCormick, 162 N. C. 471, 474, 78 S. E. 303, 306 (1913) ;
COLBROOKE, CoLLAT.RaL S curiEs (2d ed. 1898) § 87. (3) The "general property"
remains in the pledgor with only a "special property" vesting in the pledgee. Sparks
v. Caldwell, 157 Cal. 401, 108 Pac. 276 (1910) ; Winnemucca State Bank and Trust Co.
v. Corbeil, 42 Nev. 378, 178 Pac. 23 (1919). For the sake of uniformity in exposition,
this note will call the pledgee a "trustee" of the surplus, as in Aab v. French, 279 S. NV.
435 (Mo. 1926).
7. National Bank of Republic of Chicago v. American Brevng Co., 79 Mont. 605,
257 Pac. 1043 (1927) ; Hodge v. Truax, 184 Wash. 360, 51 P. (2d) 357 (1935) ; Bnm;-
NAN, NEGorOaTBLE INSTRU! ENTS LAw (5th ed. 1932) §§ 27, 51.
& See Tooke v. Newman, 75 Ill. 215, 218 (1874); 2 D~ m., NEcorlT LE Ixsnu-
NIENTs (7th ed. 1933) § 974.
9. Willing v. Lupin Building and Loan Ass'n, 20 F. Supp. 774, id. 777 (E. D. Pa.
1937) (colfateral note less than debt) ; Aab v. French, 379 S. NV. 435 (Mo. 1926) (col-
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
The bank as pledgee is treated as a holder for value in toto; it could apply
the entire proceeds of the note to the debt of the pledgor, and the relationship
between pledgee and maker is identical with the ordinary banker-customer
set-off. Nor do the general creditors occupy a more disadvantageous position
than customarily, for the real amount of the debt, as in the case of independent
causes of action, is deemed to be the difference between the two series of
obligations. And unless the pledgor also possesses a credit balance with the
bank at the time of insolvency-a situation to be considered later-he suffers
no prejudice, for despite the set-off his debt is deemed paid to the extent of
the collateral note.10
A different result occurs, however, when the collateral note exceeds the
debt for which it was pledged. The pledgee is then a holder for value only
to the extent of the debt and the maker is entitled to set off his deposit only
up to that amount. Since the excess must be returned to the pledgor, to that
extent the receiver is suing only as trustee and there is no basis for a set-off."1
More complicated is the problem where the depositor's note represents only
a small part of the collateral which, in the aggregate, exceeds the pledgor's
debt. Then the question of whether the depositor's note is to be considered
a part of the surplus may depend upon the fortuitous circumstance of how
the receiver chose to realize on the collateral. If the customer's note is one
of those selected before satisfaction of the debt, the customer, could claim a
set-off as in the first type situation.' 2 But for any amount collected after-
wards, the receiver would again be considered a trustee and "mutuality," as
the courts term it, would be lacking.' 3
If the pledgor in either of these situations had a credit balance in the bank
at the time of sequestration, he too may claim a set-off. Rather than accept
a dividend on the basis of his entire deposit claim while the collateral note
is used to eradicate his indebtedness, the pledgor obviously would prefer
to set-off his deposit against his debt and recover the full proceeds of the
collateral note independently. The effect would be to deprive the maker of
the collateral note of the benefits of a set-off to which he would otherwise
be entitled. This result is permitted on the ground that the pledgor is prl-
marily liable and is entitled to a return of his collateral upon payment of his
debt.' 4 However, if the pledgor's deposit is less than his debt, it seems con-
lateral note exactly equal to debt) ; Love v. Hytken, 168 Miss. 194, 150 So. 777 (1933)
(semble). But cf. Cosmopolitan Trust Co. v. Golub, 252 Mass. 574, 147 N. E. 847
(1925) (shares of credit union as collateral; set-off denied).
10. Aab v. French, 279 S.W. 435 (Mo. 1926).
11. Meeker v. Halsey, 87 F. (2d) 299 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937) (because it was not
clear whether the collateral exceeded the debt for which it was pledged, the case was
remanded for a new trial, with instructions to permit a set-off only in case the pledged
assets were not enough to pay the pledgor's debt). But cf. Leonard v. Taylor, 183 Ark.
933, 39 S. W. (2d) 704 (1931) (state warrants; court apparently overlooked fact that
collateral greatly exceeded the debt).
12. Meeker v. Halsey, 87 F. (2d) 299 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937).
13. Cf. Perring v. Baltimore Trust Corp., 171 Md. 618, 190 At. 516 (1937).
14. Southern Ry. Co. v. Elliott, 86 F. (2d) 294 (C. C. A. 4th, 1936). It might also
be argued that the pledgor is more entitled to a set-off than the maker, since.the pledgor
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sistent with existing doctrine to permit the maker to set off his own deposit
to the extent of the difference.' 5
When the insolvent bank occupies the position of pledgor rather than
pledgee, the commingling of the doctrines of set-off and collateral presents
another set of problems. To secure a loan from a third party, the bank pledges
a note upon which one of its depositors is obligated as maker.10 The right
of the customer to set off his deposit balance may then be raised in three
types of suit: (1) By the receiver for the pledgor bank against the customer-
maker after redemption of the pledge; (2) by the pledgee against the customer-
maker; and (3) by the customer against the pledgor to be reimbursed for
money paid to the pledgee.
The question of set-off may arise in a suit by the receiver for the bank
upon the customer's collateral note which the receiver has redeemed after the
sequestration of assets. Since events after insolvency are supposedly in-
operative as to set-offs 7 denial of a set-off might theoretically be anticipated,
especially where the depositor's note would have had to satisfy the pledgee's
lien if the latter had collected upon the collateral in order of maturity. But a
suit against a depositor on a redeemed note resembles so closely the ordinary
banker-customer situation, that courts unhesitatingly permit the set-off. Jus-
tification is found in the idea that the redeemed note is an asset of the insolvent
estate and, as such, a proper subject for a set-off.18
The crux of the second problem is whether the pledgee, in a suit against
the maker upon the collateral note, is subject to claims of set-off which the
maker, as depositor, may have had against the pledgor bank. This depends
upon the time and character of the pledge. If the note is transferred after
sequestration as security for an antecedent debt, the pledgee takes subject to
the customer's right of set-off, regardless of whether the note had yet matured
when pledged.' 9 However, if the pledge was made before sequestration, the
pledgee is deemed a holder for value; ordinarily he could recover the full
amount of the collateral note and retain the excess, if any, in trust for the
pledgor.2 0 But to avoid circuity of action, a pledgee is limited to the extent
consciously entered into the transaction with the bank which gave rise to the set-off
possibility, whereas a set-off would come as a mere "windfall" to the maker.
15. The pledgor would not be injured, nor would the general creditors lose any
more than where the receiver for the pledgee bank sues on the maker's note which it
holds as collateral security for a debt larger or equal in amount. See note 10, nipra.
16. Bank borrowings from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation have recently
accounted for many of these situations. See cases cited note 25, infra. Rcdiscounting
of a customer's note raises similar problems. See Moore & Sussman, supra note 1, at
1131.
17. See note 5, supra.
18. Ellerbe v. Studebaker Corp., 21 F. (2d) 993 (C. C. A. 4th, 1927); Clute v.
Warner, 8 App. Div. 40, 40 N. Y. Supp. 392 (3d Dep't 1896); Williams v. Burgess,
74 V. Va. 623, 82 S. E. 507 (1914); French v. Commercial aVll Paper Mills, Inc.,
100 Ind. App. 573, 197 N. F. 716 (1935).
19. First Nat. Bank of Rocky Ford v. Lewis, 57 Colo. 124, 139 Pac. 1102 (1914)
(after maturity); Merchants' Excchange Bank v. Fuldner, 92 Wis. 415, 65 N. IV. 691
(1896) (before maturity).
20. See note 8, supra.
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of his beneficial interest whenever the maker of the note has a right of set-
off against the pledgor. Thus if the collateral note exceeds the debt for which
it was pledged, the maker can set off his deposit with the pledgor to the
extent of the surplus.21 But where the customer's note is only one of many
items pledged in an amount exceeding the debt, as usually happens in large-
scale borrowing, the question arises whether it is fair to permit his note to
be collected when the pledgee has available other collateral notes whose makers
are not entitled to set-offs. One solution has been to require the pledgee to
demonstrate as a prerequisite to recovery that other collateral security for the
debt was invalid or uncollectible ;22 and it has -been suggested that the maker
may safeguard its interest by bringing an action against the pledgee to compel
it to exhaust other collateral first.23 But this remedy is usually denied on
the ground that the customer-maker is a debtor of the pledgee and therefore
not entitled to the marshalling rights of a co-creditor.
24
The customer is not without a remedy, however, where, unaware of his
set-off rights, 25 he has paid the full amount of his note to a pledgee whose
total collateral exceeded the debt from the bank to the pledgee. In an action
against the receiver, the customer may then be reimbursed for the amount
of his note out of the surplus returned by the pledgee.20 This is on the theory
21. Otherwise, the pledgee would have to return the surplus to the receiver for the
pledgor bank and the customer would then be entitled to reimbursement out of the excess.
Yellowstone Nat. Bank v. Gagnon, 19 Mont. 402, 48 Pac. 762 (1897); National Bank
of Commerce v. Bottolfson, 55 S. D. 196, 225 N. W. 385 (1929), 69 A. L. R. 898 (1930).
22. Livestock State Bank v. Locke, 277 S. W. 405 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925).
23. This procedure is suggested in Seymour v. Becker, 71 Minn. 394, 73 N. W.
1096 (1898). Supporting authority is scanty. In Cheical Nat. Bank v. Kiam, 52 Tex.
Civ. App. 253, 113 S. W. 948 (1908), the court applied the doctrine of marshaling assets
and securities.
24. Sowell v. Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, 294 Fed. 798 (C. C. A. 5th, 1923);
Merchants and Marine Bank of Pascagoula, Miss. v. Hibernia Bank & Trust Co., 16 F.
Supp. 433 (E. D. La. 1936); Hanesley v. National Park Bank of New York, 147 Ga.
96, 92 S.E. 879 (1917).
25. The effect is the same whether the customer was totally ignorant of his rights
or whether he was forced to relinquish his verbal claims by the superior bargaining
position of the pledgee. Red Bank Bldg. & Loan Assn v. Aling, 20 F. Supp. 474
(D. N. J. 1937) (no waiver even though collateral note was non-negotiable). See also
Merchants' Ice & Fuel Co. v. Holland Banking Co., 8 S.W. (2d) 1030 (Mo. 1928)
(pledgee represented that collateral note was sold to him) ; Powell v. Hood, 211 N. C,
137, 189 S. E. 483 (1937) (R. F. C., pledgee, claimed to be holder in due course).
26. Reimbursement is allowed whether the returned surplus is composed of un-
collected notes [Red Bank Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Ailing, 20 F. Supp. 474 (D. N. 3.
1937); Seymour v. Becker, 71 Minn. 394, 73 N. W. 1096 (1899); Powell v. Hood,
211 N. C. 137, 189 S. E. 483 (1937)], or of collected proceeds [Merchants' Ice & Fuel
Co. v. Holland Banking Co., 8 S.W. (2d) 1030 (Mo. 1928); Schaeffer v. Ruden, 61
S. b. 64, 246 N. W. 105 (1932). Contra: Balbach v. Frelinghuysen, 15 Fed. 675 (C. C.
D. N. J. 1883)]. Where a number of depositors are similarly situated, the receiver is
to distribute the surplus pro rata. Hall v. Burrell, 22 Colo. App. 278, 124 Pac. 751
(1912). But apparently no reimbursement will be allowed if the total collateral at the
time of the realization on the pledge did not exceed the debt for which it was pledged.
Leach v. City-Commercial Say. Bank of Mason City, 207 Ia. 1254, 219 N. W. 496 (1928)
(semble).
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that since the customer could have set off his deposit balance if the bank had
not pledged his note, he should be entitled to a share of the surplus for which
his payment was partially responsible. The general creditors are said to have
no interest in the pledged collateral until the claims of the pledgee and the
equities of the maker-depositor have been satisfied.
27
The almost monotonous consistency with which the various combinations
of collateral security and set-off principles dovetail tends to obscure the
fortuitous nature of the depositor's set-off rights. Where his note has been
pledged by a third party to the depositor's bank, the outcome depends upon
the course of the receiver's action. And the customer apparently has no
remedial device to compel the receiver to realize upon collateral in a manner
which will procure for him the benefit of a set-off. On the other hand, the
receiver has some power to further the interests of the general creditors by
diminishing as far as possible the opportunity for customers to set off their
deposits. When he holds the customer's note as collateral for another's debt,
he can first exhaust every other means of collecting the principal debt not
only by pressing the principal debtor but also, if he finds a large amount of
excess collateral for the third party's debt, by attempting to realize upon col-
lateral other than the customer's note. A pledgor who is also a depositor is
in a better position, however, to claim any credit balance in his current account
with the pledgee bank as an off-set against his own debt, thus leaving him
free to collect the entire proceeds of the collateral note from the principal
obligor. In instances where the customer's note has been pledged by his bank,
the sphere of ingenuity is severely circumscribed by the readiness with which
courts grant reimbursement to the customer. The primary aim, then, should
be to avoid circuity in achieving the ultimate satisfaction of claims.
ENFORCEMENT OF AFFIRMATIVE COVENANTS RUNNING WITH THE LAND*
ALTHOUGH the English courts have consistently held that affirmative
covenants will not be made to run with the land either in law or in equity,'
the American law on this point has fallen into confusion. Of forty-two cases
involving the running of affirmative covenants decided during the last ten
27. See cases cited note 26, supra. A few courts have reached a contrary decision
either on the legalistic ground that since the bank had no right to demand any part
of its collateral until full payment of its indebtedness, a set-off was precluded beause
the collateral note was not its property at the time of insolvency [Balbach v. Freling-
huysen, 15 Fed. 675, 686 (C. C. D. N. J. 1883)], or on the ground that the depositor
has waived any right of set-off by voluntarily paying the note, even though under protest.
Leach v. City-Commercial Savings Bank of Mason City, Ia., 207 Ia. 1254, 219 N. jV.
496 (1928). But see Red Bank Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Alling, 20 F. Supp. 474 (D. N. J.
1937) (no waiver even though collateral note was non-negotiable).
*Maher v. Cleveland Union Stockyards Co., 55 Ohio App. 412, 9 N. F (2d) 995
(1936).
1. E. & G. C., Ltd. v. Bate (1935) 79 L. J. 203 (K. B. 1935).
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years,2 the covenants were enforced in twenty-one," stated by way of dicta
to run in two,4 and not enforced in nineteen. 5 Twenty-five states are repre-
sented by these decisions, of which ten are to be found in the enforcing
column, nine in the non-enforcing column, and six in both.
The chaotic condition of the American cases has resulted from both an
uncritical acceptance and an inconsistent use of ancient theories. Conven-
tionally, a real covenant is said to have four "essentials:" nature, form,
intent, and privity. 6 "Nature" refers to the sixteenth century doctrine that
2. Covenants to pay rent have been excluded from this discussion. It is well
settled that such covenants run with the land. See (1936) 102 A. L. R. 781, 784.
3. Zanes v. Lehigh Valley Transit Co., 41 F. (2d) 552 (E. D. Pa. 1930); Cum-
mings v. Alexander, 233 Ala. 10, 169 So. 310 (1936) (running of benefit); Pedro v.
Humboldt County, 217 Cal. 493, 19 P. (2d) 776 (1933) (running of benefit); Wana-
maker Ditch Co. v. Pettit, 89 Colo. 344, 3 P. (2d) 295 (1931); Proctor v. Redfern,
182 Ga. 175, 185 S. E. 255 (1936); Carder v. Hughett, 243 Ill. App. 170 (1926);
Dodd v. Rotterman, 330 Ili. 362, 161 N. E. 756 (1928); Stover v. Harlan, 87 Ind.
App. 347, 154 N. E. 882 (1927); Fair Bldg. Co. v. Wineman Realty Co., 87 Ind. App.
520, 156 N. E. 433 (1927); Swiss Oil Corp. v. Dials, 232 Ky. 298, 22 S. W. (2d)
912 (1929) ; Union Trust Co. of Md. v. Rosenburg, 171 Md. 409, 189 Atl. 421 (1937) ;
Mueller v. Bankers Trust Co. of Muskegon, 262 Mich. 53, 247 N. W. 103 (1933)
(running of benefit); Robins v. Wright, 331 Mo. 377, 53 S. W. (2d) 1046 (1932) ;
Child v. C. H. Winans Co., 119 N. J. Eq. 556, 183 Atl. 300 (1936); Morgan Lake Co.
v. N.Y., N.H. & H. R.R., 262 N.Y. 234, 186 N. E. 685 (1933); Kennilwood Owners'
Ass'n, Inc., v. Jaybro Realty & Development Co., Inc., 156 Misc. 604, 281 N. Y. Supp.
541 (Sup. Ct. 1935); Matter of Acquiring Title to East 96th St., N. Y. L. J., Dec.
21, 1937, p. 2296, col. 1 (Sup. Ct.) (running of benefit); Maher v. Cleveland Union
Stockyards Co., 9 N. E. (2d) 995 (Ohio App. 1936); Guild v. Wallis, 130 Ore. 148,
279 Pac. 546 (1929); Beck v. Lane County, 141 Ore. 580, 18 P. (2d) 594 (1933);
Cohen v. Turner, 90 Pa. Super. Ct 255 (1926).
4. See Levy v. Schnurmacher Construction Corp., 255 N. Y. 83, 86, 174 N. E.
70, 71 (1930); Parks v. Hines, 68 S. W. (2d) 364, 367 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934).
5. Brewster-Greene v. Robinson, 34 Ariz. 547, 273 Pac. 538 (1929); Holthoff v.
Joyce, 174 Ark. 248, 294 S. W. 1006 (1927); Ft. Smith Gas Co. v. Gean, 186 Ark.
573, 55 S. W. (2d) 63 (1932); Layne v. Bryant, 108 Cal. App. 324, 291 Pac. 615
(1930); Coulter v. Sausalito Bay Water Co., 122 Cal. App. 480, 10 P. (2d) 780 (1932);
Bradford Realty Corp. v. Beetz, 108 Conn. 26, 142 At. 395 (1928); Keogh v. Peck,
259 Ill. App. 503 (1931); Cambais v. Douglas, 167 La. 791, 120 So. 369 (1929);
Gilman v. Forgione, 129 Me. 66, 149 At. 620 (1930) (running of benefit); Mayo
v. Dearborn, 131 Me. 455, 163 AtI. 779 (1933) (running of benefit); Orenburg v.
Johnston, 269 Mass. 312, 168 N. E. 794 (1929); Buhl Land Co. v. Franklin Co., 258
Mich. 377, 242 N. W. 772 (1932); Poage v. Quincy, 0. & K. C. R.R., 23 S. W. (2d)
221 (Mo. App. 1930); Guaranty Trust Co. of N. Y. v. New York & Q. C. Ry.,
253 N. Y. 190, 170 N. E. 887 (1930), reargument denied, 254 N. Y. 126 (1930), appeal
di.smissed, 282 U. S. 803 (1930); Greenfarb v. R. S. K. Realty Corp., 229 App. Div.
250, 241 N. Y. Supp. 439 (1930) (running of benefit); Epting v. Lexington Water
Power Co., 177 S. C. 308, 181 S. E. 66 (1935); Montgomery v. Creager, 22 S. W.
(2d) 463 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929); Lincoln Fireproof Warehouse Co. v. Greusel, 199
Wis. 428, 224 N. W. 98 (1929), aff'd on reargumenl, 199 Wis. 428, 227 N. W. 6
(1929); Lingle Water Users' Ass'n v. Occidental Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 43 Wyo. 41,
297 Pac. 385 (1931).




only covenants which touch and concern the thing demised may run with
the land.7 -Although this principle appears in almost all the decisions, its
meaning is still uncertain. In cases involving covenants to maintain drain-
age ditches upon land conveyed, the Oregon court held that the covenant
touched and concerned the land,8 while the California court stated that the
agreement was not a covenant touching and concerning, but was a mere
personal undertaking;9 yet both courts enforced the agreement. A covenant
to furnish electric power from land conveyed to land retained has been denied
enforcement on the ground that it did not concern the land,10 but it has
been held that a grantor's agreement to build a bridge upon land other than
that conveyed related to and ran with the grantee's land.- The decisions
on the second of the four "essentials," the need for technical requirements,
are also irreconcilable. Two courts held technical words unnecessary and
enforced the covenants.' 2 Two other courts refused to enforce the covenants
on the express ground of failure to follow technical form and include the
cabalistic words.13 Furthermore, in regard to the relation of the intent of
the original parties to the question of the covenant's running,14 it has been
held that intent is always a material inquiry,'0 that it is the decisive element
even where the covenant concededly touches the land, 0 and, on the other
hand, that it does not control even where the parties clearly intended the
covenant to run.' 7 Finally, of the "four essentials of a real covenant," only
the last, privity, seems to have lost its argumentative significance. The courts
have generally accepted the definition of privity which limits it to the mere
7. Spencer's Case, 5 Coke, 16(a) (K. B. 1583). For a modern apotheosis of
touch and concern, see Gavit, Covenants Running ith the Land (1930) 24 ILL. L
Rxv. 786.
8. Guild v. Wallis, 130 Ore. 148, 279 Pac. 546 (1929). Although the court en-
forced the obligation, it became so engrossed in the touch and concern doctrines that
it quoted from a previous case to prove that the covenant was beneficial to the plaintiff
as owner, and to no other person, and consequently ran with the plaintiff's land. Since
the running of the benefit was not at issue, and since that fact would furnish no reason
for the running of the burden, it is difficult to determine the releance of this test.
9. Pedro v. Humboldt County, 217 Cal. 493, 19 P. (2d) 776 (1933) (running
of the benefit). Accord: Greenfarb v. R. S. K. Realty Corp., 229 App. Div. 250, 241
N. Y. Supp. 439 (1930). For the status of the New York Rule, see (1927) 12 Conn.
L. Q. 404; (1933) 19 Coax. L. Q. 145.
10. Epting v. Lexington Water Power Co., 177 S. C. 303, 181 S. E. 66 (1935),
(1936) 13 N. Y. U. L Q. REv. 313.
11. Mueller v. Bankers Trust Co. of Muskegon, 262 Mich. 53, 247 N. NV. 103
(1933) (running of the benefit).
12. Pedro v. Humboldt County, 217 Cal. 493, 19 P. (2d) 776 (1933) ; Union Trust
Co. of Md. v. Rosenburg, 171 Md. 409, 189 AUt. 421 (1937), (1937) 1 My. L Rnv. 320.
13. Mayo v. Dearborn, 131 Me. 455, 163 Ad. 779 (1933) (stipulation in deed poll,
instead of sealed covenant signed by both parties); Lincoln Fireproof Warehouse Co.
v. Greusel, 199 Wis. 428, 224 N. NV. 98 (1929) (failure to refer to "assigns").
14. CLARuK, op. cit. supra note 6, at 74, 75.
15. Bradford Realty Corp. v. Beetz, 103 Conn. 26, 142 AUt. 395 (1928).
16. Gilman v. Forgione, 129 Me. 66, 149 At. 620 (1930).
17. Keogh v. Peck, 259 fIL App. 503 (1931).
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succession to the interest of one of the original parties to the covenant,18
and either ignore or glide over it in the decisions.'9
Another element producing confusion has been the union of law and
equity.20 The equity courts had developed a doctrine that an assignee who
took the land with actual or constructive notice of a restrictive covenant
was bound by the covenant.21 With the union of law and equity, courts were
able to draw upon this doctrine as well as those developed at common law
to enforce affirmative covenants. The result was to blur whatever indistinct
lines had theretofore existed between legal and equitable covenants, and to
render it difficult to determine whether the equitable doctrines were main-
taining a separate existence or had caused an extension of the common law
rule. Furthermore, the equitable doctrines were no more consistently applied
than the common law rules. In the eyes of one court notice is an immaterial
element,2 2 and in the eyes of another it is a requisite for liability on a covenant
already held to run with the land.23 It has been held, on one hand, that
purchase with notice of the covenant could not render enforceable a covenant
which did not relate to or concern the land,24 and, on the other, that con-
structive notice rendered a covenant enforceable whether it ran with the
land or not.25 Moreover, some courts employ constructive notice as a basis
for implying-from vague words in the grant-an assumption of the covenant
by the assignee.
26
A recent case, however, seems to indicate a willingness to lay aside many
of these metaphysical doctrines and look solely at the intent of the parties
and the equities of the situation. From plaintiff's father, defendant's prede-
18. An exception to this general development is the "Massachusetts doctrine of
substituted privity," which requires a tenure relation, i.e., that covenantor and covenantee
each have an interest in the land beyond the covenant. See (1930) 39 YALE L. J. 911.
This view has been criticized by Dean Clark as masking a policy against encumbrances
under the cover of another doctrine. See Clark, The Doctrine of Privily of Estate in
Connection with Real Covenants (1922) 32 YArx L. 3. 123, 142.
19. For example, in Maher v. Cleveland Union Stockyards Co., 9 N. E. (2d) 995
(Ohio App. 1936), the court expressly found the plaintiff in privity with the covenantee
by virtue of a deed passing all the covenantee's interest, but never -considered the
question of privity between the defendant and the covenantor.
20. Lloyd, Enforcement of Affirmative Agreements Respecting the Use of Land
(1928) 14 VA. L. REv. 419.
21. This theory is the "equitable doctrine of Tulk v. Moxhay," 2 Phil. 774 (Ch.
1848), so-called from the renowned decision which is accredited with the birth of the
rule.
22. Coulter v. Sausalito Bay Water Co., 122 Cal. App. 480, 10 P. (2d) 780 (1932).
23. Poage v. Quincy, 0. & K. C. R.R., 23 S. W. (2d) 221 (Mo. App. 1930).
The court was here applying the equitable doctrine to a covenant to maintain ditches,
the sort of covenant clearly cognizable at law.
.24. Montgomery v. Creager, 22 S. V. (2d) 463 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929).
25. Guild v. Wallis, 130 Ore.-148, 279 Pac. 546 (1929).
26. Zanes v. Lehigh Valley Transit Co., 41 F. (2d) 552 (E. D. Pa. 1930) ; Wana-
maker Ditch Co. v. Pettit, 89 Colo. 344, 3 P. (2d) 295 (1931); Swiss Oil Corp. v.
Dials, 232 Ky. 298, 22 S. W. (2d) 912 (1929). Contra: Lingle Water Users' Ass'n
v. Occidental Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 43 Wyo. 41, 297 Pac. 385 (1931).
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cessor in title bought a strip of land for a consideration of two dollars
and a promise to save the grantor harmless from all assessments on his
adjoining property for the opening by the city of a street over the strip.
The deed conveying the strip to defendant from the covenantor referred to
the conditions in the deed to its predecessor. Thirty years after the sale, the
city opened the street, and several years later laid a sewer. The tract con-
veyed by her father to plaintiff was assessed for the opening of the street
and installation of the sewer. In an action against defendant, plaintiff re-
covered both assessments. But the Court of Appeals of Ohio reversed the
judgment for the sewer assessment 27 while affirming that for the street
assessment328
To one result of the instant case, the running of the benefit of the covenant,
there should be little objection. The court relied on a supposition that the
assignee had succeeded to all the interest of the grantor by means of a quit-
claim deed. Actually the deed was not a quitclaim,20 but this fact would
not affect the succession theory. Furthermore, the court did not need to
look to the terms of the deed, for only a present owner of the retained
property could benefit directly from performance of the covenant. As assess-
ments are charged against the land and not against the individual owner,
the covenant would seem to be a promise to pay the city. There would be
nothing for the promisee of a personal covenant to take, for the only claimant
who could show an interest beside the city would be the present owner
whom the covenantor has failed to protect and who has been forced to pay
the city himself. Finally, the running of the benefit is generally to be favored,
for it is then easier to ascertain and locate the holder of that beneficial inter-
est, an important problem whenever a release of the obligation is desired.
But the other result of the instant case, that affirmative covenants which
the parties intend to run will bind an assignee who takes with notice, might
well be questioned. In applying this test, the court found both constructive
notice in the recording of the first deed and actual notice in the second
deed's reference to conditions set out in the first. And to find the requisite
intent the court regarded the covenant as the actual consideration and the
conveyance as a grant of bare title with a postponement of payment of the
consideration.30 Adoption of intent as a guiding test would introduce no
27. The court considered the laying of a sewer unnecessary to the opening of a
street and found that the parties did not intend the covenant to include anything done
upon the street subsequent to the opening.
28. Maher v. Cleveland Union Stockyards Co., 9 N. F- (2d) 995 (Ohio App.
1936). A settlement was reached after this decision, and no further appeal was prose-
cuted. Communication to the YALE LAW JOURNAL from defendant's counsel, Oct. 15,
1937.
29. Brief for Defendant filed in the Supreme Court of Ohio for an appeal which
'was later abandoned.
30. This splitting of the transferred estate is analogous to the theory of a grant
of title with restriction upon user, which has been employed in the party-vall cases.
See Clark, Party Wall Agreements as Real Covenants (1924) 37 HAnv. L. Rm. 301,
311. The court also used an argument of estoppel, which has been relied upon to
enforce the running of the benefit of a similar covenant. Matter of Acquiring Title
to East 96th St., N. Y. L. J., Dec. 21, 1937, p. 2296, col. 1 (Sup. Ct).
1938] NOTES
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
certainty into this confused field of law, but would re-emphasize the judicial
discretion to decide what covenants shall run-a discretion of which the courts
have often lost sight because the ancient theories designed merely to aid in
administering a rule were permitted to obscure the rule. But to say that
intent exists where a covenant is the consideration for a deed would make
all covenants run; for every covenant may properly be said to constitute part
of the consideration.31 The same result would probably ensue from general
use of the notice doctrine. For although the finding of the specific fact of
notice, constructive or actual, is required, such a finding has become increas-
ingly easier under modern recordation systems.
32
Furthermore, the general enforcement of all affirmative covenants that
are unlimited in duration will encounter the policy of fostering the alien-
ability of land which underlies both the English affirmative covenant rule and
the Rule against Perpetuities.33 Against that policy must be weighed two
opposing policies: to promote freedom of contract and to prevent unjust
enrichment. But the unjust enrichment argument, once it had been held
that no affirmative covenants run, would not seem very persuasive to a court
willing to indulge in the presumption regarding knowledge of the law; yet
today it is a strong force in specific instances. 34 The freedom of contract
justification, however, directly contradicts the argument advanced in behalf
of the English rule, for the proposition is that by fostering freedom of
contract men will derive the greatest possible economic advantage from the
use of land. Indeed, the English view has been controverted by supporters
of the American rule who maintain that the running of affirmative covenants
and equitable servitudes will not clog but will enhance land's alienability.a6
The final resolution of this conflict may well await a factual analysis of the
effect of affirmative covenants upon land's alienability. 6 But until that time,
31. This effect might be narrowed by distinguishing between covenants recognized
as the substantial consideration and covenants regarded as merely incidental consideration.
32. Different requirements for title search might bear on the finding of constructive
notice. See (1936) 21 CorN. L. Q. 479.
33. The Rule against Perpetuities is directed against remoteness in the vesting of
interests and not against remoteness in the accrual of liability. It does not apply to real
covenants or other contracts which do not offend against the vesting doctrine. Clem
v. Valentine, 155 Md. 19, 141 Atl. 710 (1928) (restrictive covenant); see Leach, Per-
petuities in a Nutshell (1938) 51 HARV. L. REv. 638, 660; Comments (1934-35) 23 GEo.
L. J. 105, 301, and 519. It has been maintained that the Rule should apply to option-to-
purchase covenants and to party-wall covenants. For a device to avoid the Rule in the
latter class of covenants, see Clark, mspra note 30, at 311. For arguments against applying
the Rule to the former class of covenants, see Comment (1925) 35 YALE L. J. 213.
34. See Maher v. Cleveland Union Stockyards Co., 9 N. E. (2d) 995, 998 (Ohio
App. 1936) (running of burden); Pedro v. Humboldt County, 217 Cal. 493, 497, 19 P.
(2d) 776, 777 (1933) (running of benefit).
35. See 2 SImEs, FuTuRE INTER.,sTs (1936) § 513.
36. A compromise in this policy conflict has been suggested. Its proponents would
permit affirmative covenants to run only in the building subdivision situations, where
there is the additional social purpose of fostering city planning, as opposed to the more
directly selfish aims of the individual contractors in the ordinary covenant case. Com-
ment (1938) 51 HARV. L. REv. 320, 326. Not only would this compromise add another
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it would seem that the controlling considerations should be the doctrines
of intent and notice. For these doctrines should remove much of the con-
fusion in analysis and argument, and the result avoids the inconsistency of
the English rule which permits restrictive covenants to run despite the fact
that the alienability arguments apply equally well to them.
APPLICATION OF STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS TO FORGED INDORSEMENTS
IN CHECK COLLECTION CASES*
TiE POINT at which the Statute of Limitations begins to run in favor of
one who indorses a check upon which a prior indorsement has been forged
is generally said to depend upon whether the bank receiving the check is a
purchaser or an agent of the prior party.' If it is considered a purchaser, the
collection bank may recover from previous indorsers upon any one of three
rationales. But whichever one of the various theories of action the purchaser
may happen to select, the running of the Statute is appro.dmately the same,
for, according to the majority rule, the time of discovery of the forgery is
always immaterial.
2
As the first of his alternative courses of action, the purchaser may sue on
the theory that the forged indorsement was wholly inoperative,3 and that
category to invite interpretation and exceptions, but also it would leave unchanged,
except for the extension in this one situation, the inconsistency in allowing the running
of restrictive covenants. Horizontal limitations on encumbrances are preferable to
vertical limitations but should be left to legislative edict. See Cwm, op. cit. spma
note 6, at 139, n. 58.
*Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, for use of American Surety Co. of New York
v. Atlanta Trust Co., 91 F. (2d) 283 (C. C. A. 5th, 1937).
1. Turner, Deposits of Demand Paper as Purehases (1928) 37 YALE L. J. 874.
The distinction between a bank as purchaser or agent has usually been made in con-
templation of the problem involving the liability of the bank of deposit for negligent
collection of checks. Under the New York collection rule, the bank of deposit is the
purchaser, and is liable for the acts of its sub-agents, while under the so-called Massa-
chusetts rule, it is merely an agent for transmission of paper to the proper correspondents.
For a brief discussion of the two rules, their origin, and relative merits, see Comment
(1924) 33 YALE L. J. 753, n. 1.
In the present discussion, "purchaser," or "agent," refers to the relationship between
the intermediate banks through which the paper has to pass in its vay from the bank
of deposit to the drawee. This relationship is not based on the relation of the original
bank of deposit to its depositor but upon the nature of the transaction between each
indorsee bank and its immediately prior indorser. See Steffen, The Chech Collection
Muddle (1936) 10 TULANE L. REv. 537.
2. Leather Manufacturers Bank v. Merchants Bank, 128 U. S. 26 (188); United
States v. National Bank of Commerce, 205 Fed. 433 (C. C. A. 9th, 1913); Ladd .&
Tilton Bank v. United States, 30 F. (2d) 334 (C. C. A. 9th, 1929) ; Fourth Nat. Bank
v. Gainesville Nat. Bank, 80 F. (2d) 490 (C. C. A. 5th, 1935). Contra: Ripley v.
Withee, 27 Tex. 14 (1863).
3. NEGOTmALE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 23.
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it therefore deprived his transferor of any title to the proceeds received by
the latter from the sale of the instrument.4 Payment having been made by
mistake, 5 the purchaser would acquire a quasi contractual remedy in the
nature of an action for money had and received.0 This cause of action un-
doubtedly accrues at the time of payment, and, consequently, the Statute starts
running at that date.7 Secondly, the transferee may base his suit upon Sec-
tion 66 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, which provides that one who
negotiates an instrument by general indorsement warrants, inter alia, that the
instrument is genuine and that he has title to it.8 Since the "pay any bank
or banker -all prior indorsements guaranteed" indorsement commonly used
between banks in collection transactions is usually considered general rather
than restrictive in form,9 the holder may sue any prior indorser'0 back to the
forger's transferee 1 to recover the money he has paid, for breach of either
of these warranties. In this event, it is at least arguable that, if the indorser
did not have the title he asserts by his indorsement, the warranties of title
4. District Nat. Bank of Washington v. Washington Loan and Trust Co., 65 F.
(2d) 831 (App. D. C. 1933); 1 JoYCE, DEFENSES To COMMERCIAL PAPER (2d ed. 1924)
§ 196.
5. See Leather Manufacturers Bank v. Merchants Bank, 128 U. S. 26, 35 (1888).
6. Leather Manufacturers Bank v. Merchants Bank, 128 U. S. 26 (1888) ; Central
Nat Bank v. North River Bank, 44 Hun 114 (Sup. Ct. N. Y. 1887) ; see Canal Bank
v. Bank of Albany, 1 Hill 287, 292 (Sup. Ct. N. Y. 1841).
The language in some cases seems to imply that the action for money had and
received is confined to suit against the immediately prior indorser who actually got the
plaintiff's money. Main Street Bank v. Planters Nat. Bank, 116 Va. 137, 81 S. E, 24
(1914). It has long been held in cases where no forgery is involved, however, that
there is privity between the holder and prior indorsers of the instrument which enables
the bolder to sustain an action of indebitatus assumpsit against any one of them. Frazer
v. Carpenter, 9 Fed. Cas. No. 5,069 (C. C. D. Mich. 1840). No similar cases have
been found where the issue of forgery was raised, but it would seem reasonable to apply
the foregoing doctrine in such suits to allow an action for money had and received
against any indorser subsequent to the forger.
7. See note 6, supra; Comment (1928) 41 HARv. L. REv. 1051.
8. NEaoTimABL INSTRUMENTs LAW § 66(1).
9. National Bank of Commerce v. Bossemeyer, 101 Neb. 96, 162 N. V. 503
(1917); Interstate Trust Co. v. United States Nat. Bank, 67 Colo. 6, 185 Pac. 260
(1919). Some authorities have assumed that the indorsement in question is qualified.
See 8 ZOLLMAX, BANKS AND BANKING (1936) § 5632; Main Street Bank v. Planters
Nat. Bank, 116 Va. 137, 140, 81 S. E. 24, 25 (1914), criticized in BEuTE., BRANNAN'S
NEGOTIABLE: INSTRUMENTS LAW (5th ed. 1932) 754. Even if the indorsement is qualified,
the holder may recover upon the warranties of genuineness and title under § 65. For a
discussion of the reasons for the express warranty of "all prior indorsements guaran-
teed," see Inquiries and Correspondence (1919) 36 BANKING L. J. 71.
10. See Sprague v. West Hudson County Trust Co., 92 N. J. Eq. 639, 643 (Ct. of
Errors and App. 1921).
11. Thorpe Bros. Co. v. Dickey, 51 Iowa 676, 2 N. W. 581 (1879) (holder denied
recovery against one who forged indorsement on ground that he lacked title) ; cf. Scott
v. Brazile, 292 S. W. 187 (Tex. Civil App. 1927) (assignee of forged notes allowed to
recover in tort frbm indorsement forger).
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and genuineness were breached at the moment of transfer, 2 and it is gener-
ally held, as in the case of an action for money had and received, that the
Statute starts to run at the time of indorsement or payment.13 Section 66
also affords a third remedy to the transferee, for under this section a general
indorser further engages that on due presentment the instrument will be ac-
cepted or paid according to its tenor. If the forged check is in fact dishonored,
the hold may sue prior parties upon the contract expressed in this latter
warranty.' 4 Where suit is brought upon this particular contract of indorse-
ment, however, a somewhat different rule prevails as to the Statute of Limita-
tions, and there is authority for the proposition that such an action does not
accrue until dishonor actually occurs.'r But this exception to the usual rule
that the action arises at the time of payment is of no great significance insofar
as collection transactions are concerned. In the first place, if dishonor takes
place at all, it will occur shortly after payment,' and secondly, as a matter of
actual practice, this rationale is very seldom used. In all collection cases,
.the real hardship arises only when the forged indorsement remains undis-
covered for a considerable length of time, and in such cases there is no dis-
honor of the instrument.1 7 The drawee bank will normally pay the amount
of the check and debit the drawer's account, and, when the forgery is finally
brought to light, will sue prior indorsees either for breach of warranty of
title and genuineness or for money had and received.
If the bank receiving a check for collection is considered an agent rather
than a purchaser, different factors are determinative in fixing the period
during which the action must be brought. An agent is entitled to indemni-
12. See 1 WooD, LImrTATION S (4th ed. 1916) 754.
13. Colley v. Rowan, 71 Colo. 17, 203 Pac. 669 (1922). But cf. Bowman v. Wright,
70 Ky. 375 (1870); fann v. Bradshaw's Administrator, 136 Va. 351, 118 S. B. 326
(1923).
14. See Willis v. French, 84 Me. 593, 598, 24 Adt. 1010 (1892). For a brief dis-"
cussion of the differences between a suit on the warranties of § 66 of the Negotiable
Instruments Law as contrasted with a suit on the contract to pay if the mal:er does
not, consult BIGELOw, BILLs, NoTms AND CHECKS (3d ed. 1928) §§ 299-301.
15. See note 14, supra. There is some question as to the necessity for presentment
to charge an indorser when such presentment is obviously futile because of a forged
indorsement. See Wells, Fargo & Co. v. Simpson Nat. Bank, 19 Tex. Civ. App. 635,
637, 47 S. W. 1024 (1898) (presentment held unnecessary). Contra: Collier & Pettus
v. Budd, 7 Mo. 485 (1842).
16. In the case of checks, if holder and drawee bank are in the same place, pre-
sentment must be made on the next secular day after receipt, if in different places, the
check must be put in the course of collection within the same time. Bwri.or,, op. ci.
supra, note 14, § 351. It becomes apparent that unless the forgery is discovered almost
immediately, suit on the contract of § 66 of the Negotiable Instruments Law would be
barred in about the same time as an action for money had and received.
17. No cases have been found discussing the problem of whether "dishonor" would
include situations in which the discovery of the forgery subsequent to payment results
in a disavowal of the instrument and an obligation to reimburse the dravee. But since
the instrument is actually accepted and paid such an interpretation seems unlikely. For
a discussion of the possible differences in the theory of recovery on the warranties rather
than on the contract of indorsement, see BIGELOV, 10C. cit. supra, note 14.
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fication from his principal for money paid out on the latter's behalf.18 This
cause of action does not accrue until the agent has in fact paid the money
out, or, in the bank collection cases, until the transferee has been forced to
reimburse a subsequent indorsee or the drawee bank.10 The effect of calling
a collection bank an agent of its transferor is, therefore, to delay the running
of the Statute until the forgery has actually been discovered and the bank's
title disturbed. This agency relationship usually arises because of a contrac-
tual agreement between the respective banks.20 Thus, in a recent case, the
defendant bank cashed checks in ignorance that the payee's signature had
been forged. With the usual guarantee of prior indorsements, it then turned
the checks over to plaintiff Federal Reserve Bank for collection. When the
forgery was later discovered, the plaintiff, after having reimbursed its cor-
respondent to which it had in turn sent the checks, brought suit against the
defendant for the amount thus paid out. More than six years had elapsed
between the last payment by the plaintiff to the defendant for the checks,
and the defendant pleaded the Statute of Limitations. The Circuit Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that, since Federal Reserve Regulation J
stipulated that the plaintiff had taken the checks only as agent of the defend-
ant bank,21 its action for indemnification for money paid out on the princi-
pal's behalf had not accrued until such payment was actually made.
22
By utilization of accepted concepts governing an agent's general right of
indemnification, the court in the principal case avoided what would have
otherwise been a patently harsh result. There can be no doubt that if the
plaintiff's cause of action had been predicated on its rights as a purchaser
of the checks under the Negotiable Instruments Law, the Statute of Limita-
tions would have barred recovery for the loss incurred as a result of the
forgeries. 23 But the very fact that such an action is barred by the Statute
unless the parties clearly provide for an agency relationship is illustrative of
the inadequacy of the present negotiable instruments rule. Under this rule it
is possible for a drawee bank to be liable to its depositor and yet have no
remedy against prior indorsers upon whose warranties it had relied-' This
18: Riggs v. Lindsay, 7 Cranch. 500 (1813); Bibb v. Allen, 149 U. S. 481 (1892);
RESTATEMENT, AGENCY (1933) § 439.
19. Hidalgo Steel Co. v. Moore & McCormack Co., 298 Fed. 331 (D. C. S. D. N, Y.
1923) ; Legare & O'Hear v. Fraser, 3 S. C. 377 (Strobhart 1849) ; Shearer v. Guardian
Trust Co., 136 Mo. App. 229, 116 S. W. 456 (1909); cf. Knapp v. Simon, 96 N. Y.
284 (1884).
20. For a discussion of the provisions of the A.B.A. Uniform Bank Collection Code,
among which is included a provision creating the agency relation under discussion, see
Steffen, note 1, sipra. Similar provisions are included in the Federal Reserve Regula-
tions. See note 21, infra. By sending its check for collection to the Federal Reserve
Bank, the remitting bank is held to have agreed to the conditions set forth in the
regulations. Early v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 281 U. S. 84 (1930).
21. DIGEST OF RULINGS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD (1928) 177.
22. Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, for use of American Surety Co. of New York
v. Atlanta Trust Co., 91 F. (2d) 283 (C. C. A. 5th, 1937).
23. Id., at 285; see notes 2, 7, supra.
24. The drawee of a bill of exchange who pays a holder in due course cannot recover
back the sum so paid upon discovering that the signature of the drawer is forged. Price
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is so because as between immediate indorsers the Statute runs from the time
of indorsement or payment,2 5 while as between drawer and drawee no action
accrues until the drawer has made a demand within a reasonable time after
the discovery of the forged indorsement. -Y' Nor is it possible to toll the
Statute on the ground of fraudulent concealment unless the defendant in-
dorser was himself the forger or had notice thereof when he indorsed. -7 The
injustice of the present rule is well demonstrated in those cases where the
various intermediate indorsers are domiciled in different states. Since these
parties cannot all be vouched into the original adjudication of the forgery, -
it is possible for the Statute to have run before the original indorser has been
sued by a subsequent party who has had to reimburse the drawee.2 o
The negotiable instruments rule that in the absence of an agency rela-
tionship the Statute of Limitations starts to run at the time of payment, is
not, however, a necessary consequence of the present wording of Section 66.
In the sale of chattels, a conflict exists as to the time when the action for
v. Neal, 3 Burr. 1354 (K. B. 1762) ; Aigler, The Doctrine of Price v. Areal (1926) 24
MicH. L. REv. 809.
Where it is an indorsement rather than the drawer's signature which is forged, all
authorities are agreed that the drawee has a right to compel the holder to refund money
paid on a check having the genuine signature of the drawer, although they do not agree
upon the theory of the obligation which creates the right. See First Nat. Bank v.
United States Nat. Bank, 100 Ore. 264, 292, 197 Pac. 547, 556 (1921). Three theories
of recovery are available to the drawee bank. First, it may sue upon the quasi con-
tractual duty of its transferor to return money paid by mistake. See note 5, mspra.
Second, it may rely upon the implied warranty of the transferor that lie has either
the title or the authority to collect money for the instrument. United States v. National
Exchange Bank of Providence, 214 U. S. 302 (1909). Third, under the decisions of
some courts, the warranties of §§ 65, 66 of the Negotiable Instruments Law may be
employed by drawees as to indorsements, where tie, would not, under Price v. Neal,
supra. apply to the drawer's signature. See American Excchange Nat. Bank v. York-
ville Bank of New York, 122 Misc. 616, 621 (Sup. Ct. N. Y. 1924), 204 N. Y. Supp.
621, 626, aff'd, 210 App. Div. 885 (1st Dep't 1924), 206 N. Y. Supp. 879, criticized in
BEUTEL, BRANNAN'S NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAw (5th ed. 1932) 749.
This problem has largely been taken care of by the general practice now; utilized by
banks of requiring the addition of "all prior indorsenents guaranteed" to all indorse-
ments of checks among banks. See Inquiries and Correspondence (1919) BA:NXI:.
L. J. 71.
25. See notes 7, 13, supra.
26. First Nat. Bank v. Whitman, 94 U. S. 343 (1876); Kicirman v. Chase Nat.
Bank of N. Y., 124 Misc. 173 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1924). 207 N. Y. Supp. 191. But
where the bank either in terms or in effect has denied liability to the depositor for the
amount in question, this constitutes an act on the part of the bank which obviates the
necessity for such demand and starts the statute running. Kansas City Title & Trust
Co. v. Fourth Nat. Bank, 135 Kan. 414, 10 Pac. (2d) S96 (1932).
27. 2 WoOl, LiirrATioNs (4th ed. 1916) § 276(f) (3).
28. Out of state prior indorsers cannot be made to come in and aid in the defense
of a subsequent indorser being sued on the note because no process of the court adjudi-
cating the matter can reach them. 3 FREEMAN, JiDMENrs (5th ed. 1925) 2825.
29. Cf. Fourth Nat. Bank v. Gainesville Nat. Bank, 80 F. (2d) 490 (C. C.A.
Sth, 1935).
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breach of warranty of title accrues. The minority holding is in accord with
the common interpretation of the Negotiable Instruments Law, that the cause
of action arises at the moment of sale.30 But the majority of courts have
taken a different stand and have refused to start the running of the Statute
until the vendee's title is in fact disturbed."' The Uniform Sales Act has
approved this latter view by adding a warranty of quiet enjoyment so as to
prevent the vendee from losing his remedy by limitation before he has had
any notice of the defect in his title.3 2 Since the problems raised by the sale
of a chattel with defective title and by the indorsement of a forged negotiable
instrument are substantially the same, no reason can be found why a similar
interpretation should not be adopted of the title warranty in Section 66. The
Statute of Limitations is designed primarily as a statute of repose, to prevent
fraud and afford security against stale claims which might otherwise be made
long after the facts of the transaction had been forgotten.33 Certainly, this
general purpose is not served by the present rule which may bar a remedy
to one who did not discover his cause of action until the Statute had run.
ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION UNDER LowEST
RESPONSIBLE BIDDER STATUTES*
IN THEIR capacity as large consumers of manufactured goods, both federal
and local governments are in a strong position to secure the effectuation of
desired labor policies in private industry by exerting pressure against those
with whom they do business. Thus, the federal government, by enactment of
the Walsh-Healey Act,' has taken steps to improve the remuneration and
working conditions of laborers employed to fulfill government contracts. But
the formulation of a similar policy by state and municipal bodies awarding
public contracts has generally been prevented by lowest responsible bidder
provisions in state statutes and municipal charters. These provisions, which
require that contracts be awarded upon the basis of competitive bidding to
the lowest responsible bidder were devised to protect taxpayers by outlawing
improvident and fraudulent contracts.2 For this reason the courts have in-
30. Chancellor v. Wiggins, 43 Ky. 201 (1843); Perkins v. Whelan, 116 Mass. 542
(1875).
31. Barnum v. Cochrane, 143 Cal. 642, 77 Pac. 656 (1904), (1905) 18 HAV. L.
REv. 152. '
32. UNIFORM SALES AcT, § 13(1), (2); see WILLISTON, SA.Es (2d ed. 1924) § 221.
33. See Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U. S. 135, 139 (1879) ; Davson, Mistake and the
Statute of Limitations (1936) 20 MXNN. L. REv. 481.
*Pallas v. Johnson, 100 Colo. 449, 68 P. (2d) 559 (1937).
1. 49 STAT. 2036 (1936), 41 U.S.C. § 35 (Supp. 1936). For a discussion of the
Act, see Legis. (1937) 37 CoL L. REv. 102; (1936) 25 GEo. L. J. 140.
2. See Lassiter & Co. v. Taylor, 99 Fla. 819, 825, 128 So. 14, 17 (1930) ; Attorney
General v. Public Lighting Commission, 155 Mich. 207, 213, 118 N. W. 935, 938 (1908).




terpreted these legislative mandates to furnish a definite and compulsory
course of procedure and have invalidated attempts to award contracts in any
other manner.3 Evasion by indirect methods has also been prevented. Thus
a board cannot ignore bids,4 accept bids which materially vary from the
specifications, 5 change the contractual provisions after an award,0 split up
the work to be done into several contracts each of which is below the stat-
utory requirement of competitive bidding,7 suspend bidding requirements
by declaring an emergency to exist,8 or provide that any bid may be rejected
in its absolute discretion.9 To insure administrative compliance with lowest
responsible bidder provisions, the courts not only have permitted unsuccess-
ful bidders and taxpayers to challenge the board's award by mandamus or
injunction' ° but also have sanctioned the imposition of criminal penalties
upon public officers failing to comply with these provisions."The contracting board, however, performs something more than a minis-
terial function in selecting the lowest responsible bidder, for responsibility is
not solely a matter of pecuniary ability. Thus, the lowest bidder furnishing
a completion bond is not entitled to the contract.' To the contrary, the test
3. Saginaw v. Consumers' Power Co., 213 Mich. 460, 182 N. NV. 146 (1921);
Philadelphia Co. v. Pittsburgh, 253 Pa. 147, 97 At. 1083 (1916); cf. Callaghan & Co.
v. Smith, 304 Ill. 532, 136 N. E. 748 (1922) (statute violating constitutional provision
that contracts be awarded the lowest responsible bidder held unconstitutional). The
provisions are not construed, however, to embrace all types of contracts. For a list
of those excluded, see Notes (1926) 44 A. L R. 1150, (1934) 92 A. L. I. 835.
4. Kratz v. Allentown, 304 Pa. 51, 155 At. 116 (1931).
5. Tufano v. Borough of Cliffside Park, 110 N. J. L. 370, 165 At. M62 (1933);
Ohio ex reL. Mathis Bros. Co. v. Board of Education of Cincinnati, 27 Ohio C. C. 832
(1905). Moreover, the specifications must be precise and definite so as to serve as a
common standard for all. Tice v. Long Branch, 98 N. J. L. 214, 119 At. 25 (1922);
State ex reL. Hoeffler v. Griswold, 35 Ohio App. 354, 172 N. E. 438 (1930).
6. Diamond v. Mankato, 89 Minn. 48, 93 N. NV. 911 (1903); Scola v. Board of
Education of Montclair, 77 N. J. L. 73, 71 At. 299 (Sup. Ct. 1908); Loucheim v.
Philadelphia, 218 Pa. 100, 66 Ati. 1121 (1907).
7. Gamewell Fire Alarm Telegraph Co. v. Los Angeles, 45 Cal. App. 149, 187
Pac. 163 (1919); Tompkinsville v. Miller, 195 Ky. 143, 241 S. IV. E09 (1922).
8. Safford v. Lowell, 255 Mass. 220, 151 N. E. 111 (1926); Green v. Olanoaan
County, 60 Wash. 309, 111 -Pac. 226 (1910).
9. Walker v. People ex rel. Collector of Cook County, 170 II1. 410, 48 N. B. 1010
(1897).
10. Taxpayer: Baltimore v. Keyser, 72 Md. 106, 19 At!. 705 (1890); Ledvith v.
Lincoln, 110 Neb. 425, 193 N. NV. 763 (1923). Unsuccessful bidder: St. Landry Lbr.
Co. v. Bunkie, 155 La. 892, 99 So. 687 (1924) ; Ohio ex rel. United Dist. Heating, Inc.
v. State Office Bldg. Comm., 125 Ohio St. 301, 181 N. E. 129 (1932). Contra: Colorado
Paving Co. v. Murphy, 78 Fed. 28 (C. C.A. 8th, 1897). When relief is denied in this
type of case, it is usually upon the score that the unsuccessful bidder has no standing
in court.
11. State v. Kern, 51 N. J. L. 259, 17 At. 114 (Sup. Ct. 189); see Ellefson v.
Smith, 182 Wis. 398, 401, 196 N. W. 834, 835 (1924) (malfeasance in office although
no intent to evade).
12. Wilmott Coal Co. v. State Purchasing Commission, 246 Ky. 115, 54 S. W.
(2d) 634 (1932) ; see Hibbs v. Arensberg, 276 Pa. 24, 30, 119 At. 727, 729 (1923).
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of responsibility is said to be the ability to furnish complete and timely per-
formance according to specifications. 13 Under this test the agency has con-
siderable discretion and may reject the lowest bidder because of his location,14
performance upon prior contracts,'5 facilities and equipment,1 or judgment
and integrity.
17
Although lowest responsible bidder provisions thus confer a certain amount
of discretion upon the authority awarding contracts, they generally have been
construed to prevent any policy formulation by the contract letting agency.
To achieve this end, the courts have developed a rationale based upon cost
to test the validity of awards. Under this formula an administrative agency
may not impose upon prospective bidders restrictions which might increasp
costs directly or indirectly by restricting competition; nor may it predict a
determination of responsibility upon criteria whose fulfillment would have
the same effect. Consequently, in the absence of statutory authorization,
boards cannot promulgate a system of prequalification which limits the num-
ber of bidders who may compete for a contract.18 And even where statutory
authority does exist, any system of prequalification tending to stifle compe-
tition is invalid.' 9 The cost rationale has been invoked to prevent a speci-
fication of the amount that will be paid for parts of the work.2 0 Moreover, it
has precluded payment to a contractor in bonds, because bidders without
sufficient financial strength to hold the bonds until they could be sold upon
the market to advantage might thereby be eliminated. 21 But the confining
nature of these statutory provisions has become most apparent when the board
for political or humanitarian reasons has attempted to impose upon bidders
restrictions beneficial to labor. The courts have utilized these provisions to
preclude contracting authorities from requiring the employment of home
13. See Walter v. McClellan, 113 App. Div. 295. 303, 99 N. Y. Supp. 78, 84 (1st
Dep't 1906), aff'd, 190 N. Y. 505, 83 N. E. 1133 (1907); Wilson v. New Castle, 301
Pa. 358, 364, 152 Atl. 102, 103 (1930).
14. Seventh-Day Adventist Pub. Ass'n v. Board of State Auditors, 116 Mich. 672,
75 N. IV. 95 (1898).
15. Girvin v. Simon, 116 Cal. 604, 48 Pac. 720 (1897).
16. See State ex tel. Neb. Bldg. & Inv. Co. v. Board of Com'rs of State Institutions,
105 Neb. 570, 573, 181 N. W. 530, 532 (1921); Wilson v. New Castle, 301 Pa. 358,
364, 152 Atl. 102, 103 (1930).
17. See Wilmott Coal Co. v. State Purchasing Commission, 246 Ky. 115, 118, 54
S. W. (2d) 634, 635 (1932); Chaffee v. Crowley, 49 N. D. 111, 114, 190 N. W. 308
(1922).
18. Weinstein Bldg. Corp. v. Scoville, 141 Misc. 902, 254 N. Y. Supp. 384 (Sup.
Ct. 1931).
19. Harris v. Philadelphia, 299 Pa. 473, 149 AtI. 722 (1930).
20. In re Mahan, 20 Hun. 301 (N. Y. App. Div. 1st Dep't 1880), aff'd, 81 N. Y.
621 (1880).
21. Ledwith v. Lincoln, 110 Neb. 425, 193 N. W. 763 (1923) ; cf. Philpot v. Taylor,
179 Ark. 356, 16 S. W. (2d) 4 (1929) (award of construction contract to contractor
making best bid on bonds). Payment in bonds has also been held objectionable in that
the contractor tends to overbid, and consequently the bonds are issued below par. Buffalo
v. Walker, 126 Okla. 6, 257 Pac. 766 (1925); Wilson v. Hebert, 174 S. W. 861 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1915).
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labor,2 the exclusion of convict or alien labor,2 and the observance of mini-
mum wages or maximum hours.2 4 Furthermore, where bidding has been
restricted to union bidders or where responsibility has been predicted upon
the maintenance of a union shop, the courts have not only objected upon
grounds of increased costs but also have found the action contrary to public
policy or in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.25
But the result seemingly demanded by a strict application of the cost
rationale has been avoided by several rationalizations which nevertheless leave
the doctrine inviolate. First, by placing upon the complainant the burden of
proving increased costs, one court has sustained a provision compelling the
employment of resident labor.20 Furthermore, by virtue of a presumption
that high wages are productive of a better quality of labor, wage and hour
restrictions have also been sustained, for boards with authority to contract
can specify the quality of the work and materials desired.27 And finally, to
sustain an administrative award from challenge by mandamus or injunction,
a court may require a showing of fraud,
28 or abuse of discretiono upon the
22. IMcDonough v. Washington, 20 Pa. Co. C. 345 (1898); see Altschul v. Spring-
field, 48 Ohio App. 356, 364, 193 N. . 788, 791 (1933).
23. Inge v. Board of Public Works, 135 Ala. 187, 33 So. 678 (1903); Glover v.
People ex rel. Raymond, 201 Ill. 545, 66 N. E. 820 (1903).
24. Hillig v. St. Louis, 337 Mo. 291, 85 S. W. (2d) 91 (1935); Frame v. Fell-,
167 Pa. 47 (1895).
25. Restrictions upon prospective bidders: Wright v. Hoctor, 95 Neb. 342, 145
N. V. 704 (1914) (denial of due process to taxpayers) ; Atlanta v. Stein, 111 Ga. 789,
36 S. E. 932 (1900) (public policy); Marshall & Bruce Co. v. Nashville, 109 Tenn.
495, 71 S.W. 815 (1902) (equal protection). But see Amalithone Realty Co. v. New
York, 162 Misc. 715, 716, 295 N. Y. Supp. 423, 425 (Sup. Ct. 1937). Identification of
responsibility with union shop: Davenport v. Walker, 57 App. Div. 221, 63 N. Y. Supp.
161 (3d Dep't 1901) (public policy); Miller v. Des Moines, 143 Iowa 409, 122 N. V.
226 (1909) (equal protection); Ohio ex rel. United District Heating, Inc. v. State
Office Bldg. Comm., 125 Ohio St. 301, 181 N. E. 129 (1932) (same). Contra: Pugh
Printing Co. v. Deputy State Supervisors of Elections, 22 Ohio C. C. 584 (1901). Suc-
cessful bidders have been permitted to fulfill the contracts without regarding the union
provisions. People ex rel. Single Paper Co. v. Edgcomb, 112 App. Div. 604, 93 N. Y.
Supp. 965 (4th Dep't 1906); Marshall & Bruce Co. v. Nashville, 109 Tenn. 495, 71
S.V. 815 (1902).
26. Ebbeson v. Board of Public Education, 18 Del. Ch. 37, 156 Atl. 225 (1931),
(1933) 31 MicH. L. REv. 858; cf. Altschul v. Springfield, 48 Ohio App. 356, 193 N. E.
788 (1933) (bidder's employment of local labor may be considered in determining respon-
sibility). In suits to collect tax assessments levied to pay the contractor, the burden
of proving that restrictions imposed upon the contractor have increased costs is gener-
ally placed upon the taxpayer. Pasche v. South St. Joseph Co., 174 Mo. App. 614,
190 S. W. 30 (1916); Allen v. Labsap, 188 Mo. 692, 87 S. NV. 926 (1905).
27. Wagner v. Milwaukee, 180 Wis. 640, 192 N. W. 994 (1923), uwri of error dis-
missed, 266 U. S. 585 (1924).
28. Street Improvement Dist. of Hot Springs v. Crockett, 181 Ark. 869, 28 S. NV.
(2d) 331 (1930); Missouri Service Co. v. Stanberr,; 108 S. V. (2d) 25 (Mo. 1937).
29. State ex rel. Ross v. Board of Education, 42 Ohio St. 374 (1884) ; Vilson v.
New Castle, 301 Pa. 358, 152 At. 102 (1930).
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part of the board rather than a finding that reasonable men would have reached
a different conclusion.
3 0
A recent decision suggests that the increasing unionization of workers has
made possible another exception to the uniform application of the cost for-
mula, an exception which permits a board to find in certain situations that
non-union employers in a union town are irresponsible even though they
can render a letter-perfect performance of the contract. A state purchasing
board, required by statute to award contracts to the lowest responsible bidder,
refused to accept the lowest bid, which was tendered by a bidder maintaining
an open shop, and awarded a construction subcontract to a contractor who
operated a union shop. In affirming a dismissal of a taxpayer's suit to enjoin
the award, the Colorado Supreme Court held that since the general con-
tractor's men were union members, the possible delays should they strike when
forced to work beside union men justified a finding that the subcontractor
was not responsible.31
Although the instant decision would not permit a requirement that all
bidders must maintain union shops,32 it adopts a broad definition of respon-
sibility by permitting a board making an award to consider the bidder's
labor practices in relation to those of the rest of the community. To
that extent it averts any necessity for a legislative definition of responsi-
bility with its attendant inflexibility33 and extends into other fields of public
contracts the policy which has prompted much recent federal legislation. But
these are not the only effects of the decision. In the first place, since the
National Labor Relations Act would prevent a bidder for subcontracts from
compelling his employees to unionize,34 and since he cannot interfere with
the union affiliations of the general contractor's employees,3 6 determination
of the subcontractor's responsibility will depend upon factors entirely with-
out his control. Furthermore, it is doubtful if this decision will foster the
purpose of decreasing costs to taxpayers which the lowest responsible bidder
provisions were designed to achieve; while increased costs resulting from the
employment of union labor on government contracts might be offset by a
reduced tax burden for such items as unemployment relief, these offsets may
be nonexistent unless unionization is accompanied by the employment of
home labor. On the other hand, of course, it may be desirable to restate the
meaning of "responsible" in terms of broader social ends than those subserved
by safeguarding the taxpayer's purely pecuniary interests.
30. Paterson Contracting Co. v. Hackensack, 99 N. J. L. 260, 122 At. 741 (192-);
American Water Corp. v. Mayor and Council of Florham Park, 139 Atl. 169 (N. 3.
Sup. Ct. 1927).
31. Pallas v. Johnson, 100 Colo. 449, 68 P. (2d) 559 (1937), (1937) 110 A. L. R.
1406.
32. For a statement that such restriction would be proper, see Amalithone Realty
Co. v. New York, 162 Misc. 715, 716, 295 N.Y. Supp. 423, 425 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
33. See (1933) 31 MICH. L. Rav. 858 (suggesting necessity for legislative definition).
34. In re National Electric Products Corp., C-219 and R-241, 3 NLRB, No. 47
(Aug. 30, 1937); see Comment (1938) 32 ILL L. Rv. 568.
35. Cf. United Electric Coal Cos. v. Rice, 80 F. (2d) 1 (C. C. A. 7th, 1935),
(1936) 45 YAL. L. J. 1320.
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PERSONAL LIABILITY OF TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY FOR
FAILURE TO PAY TAX CLI.ms*
WHILE ACTING as trustee in bankruptcy for an insolvent corporation, the
Irving Trust Company distributed the bankrupt's estate without paying state
taxes levied against the bankrupt. After the estate had been distributed and
the bankrupt granted its discharge, the State of Delaware brought suit to hold
the trustee personally liable for the unpaid taxes.' The complaint alleged
that no notice of the bankruptcy had been given to the plaintiff, that the trustee
failed to procure a bar order directing the plaintiff to present its claim, that
sufficient assets had been collected with which to pay the plaintiff's claim,
and that the defendant therefore became obligated to pay the taxes in full.
The defendant answered that it had neither knowledge nor notice of the
plaintiff's claim, that the claim was not duly scheduled, and that it had dis-
tributed the assets under a court order. Judgment on the pleadings in favor
of the defendant was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit on the ground that there was no active duty to discover tax claims
and that the allegations were not sufficient to indicate that the trustee had
been negligent.
2
'In order to protect public revenues,3 the Bankruptcy Act accords priority
to taxes owing to federal, state, county, or municipal governments over
general creditors 4 and provides that they are to be paid by the trustee in
bankruptcy under a court order before general distribution.5 But in those
instances where taxes are not liens upon specific property which may be fol-
lowed into the hands of third parties,0 the protection of public revenue may
be small, for the court may order the distribution of the estate in ignorance
of the existence of tax claims. To bring the existence of unpaid taxes to the
knowledge of the court, initial reliance is placed upon the bankrupt by the
requirement that he schedule his outstanding liabilities.7 The facts of the
*State of Delaware v. Irving Trust Co., 92 F. (2d) 17 (C.C. A. 2d, 1937), ecrt.
denied, 58 Sup. Ct. 283 (1937).
1. The taxes due were franchise taxes, payable as a license for the corporate
franchise and assessed annually upon the basis of the corporation's total authorized
stock. DEL_ Rr-v. CoDE (1935) §§ 96, 98. The state was seeking to enforce these taxes
as obligations, not as liens, although all taxes owed the state become liens upon the
real property of the taxpayer within the county in which the taxes are assessed. DEL.
REv. CODE (1935) § 3351. This corporation probably had no property upon which a
lien could be imposed.
2. State of Delaware v. Irving Trust Co., 92 F. (2d) 17 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937),
cert. denied, 58 Sup. Ct. 283 (1937); (1938) 16 N. C. L. R. 156.
3. See United States v. State Bank of North Carolina, 6 Pet. 29, 34 (U. S. 1832);
In re Kallak, 147 Fed. 276, 278 (D. N. D. 1906); 1 COLEY, TA ATION (4th ed. 1924)
§ 57. Some protection is needed since property in the custody of a court is not subject
to distraint for the collection of taxes. In re Tyler, 149 U. S. 164 (1893).
4. Bankruptcy Act §64(b), 11 U. S. C. §1 cI seq.
5. Bankruptcy Act § 64(a).
6. See McKennon v. Warneck, 115 Oregon 163, 166, 236 Pac. 1051, 1053 (1925);
Elmhurst State Bank v. Stone, 346 IlL 157, 161, 178 N. E. 362, 364 (1931); 3 COLEY,
TAXATroN (4th ed. 1924) § 1238.
7. Bankruptcy Act § 7(8).
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instant case indicate, however, the inexpediency of relying solely upon the
schedule submitted by the bankrupt to protect the interests of the taxing
body. Consequently, where federal tax claims are involved, additional pro-
tection is afforded the government by a general statute under which any
fiduciary may be held personally liable if he fails to pay a debt due the
United States before satisfying other of the estate's obligations.8 While this
statute does not explicitly impose a duty upon the trustee in bankruptcy, it
achieves the same result; for he will be compelled to see that outstanding
tax claims are paid before general distribution if he wishes to escape personal
liability. But the trustee's liability is not absolute. In the first place, it has
been confined to those cases in which it can be shown that he had "knowl-
edge" of the existence of the claim.9 Secondly, the trustee may protect him-
self by requesting the court to issue a bar order. Such an order directs
governments to present their claims within a definite period; and, if the taxing
body has been served with notice, failure to comply with the order will
discharge the trustee from all liability for the tax.10
On the other hand, where state or local government taxes are involved,
there is no federal statute imposing personal liability upon the trustee. In
the absence of statutory liability, responsibility might be imposed upon him
through the application of ordinary tort doctrines provided a duty to use
care can be found. Relying upon dicta found in many cases,11 the plaintiff
in the instant case argued that there is an absolute duty to pay all taxes, a,
breach of which rendered the trustee personally responsible. This duty, it
was said, might be implied from Section 64(a) of the Bankruptcy Act which
provides that the court "shall order the trustee to pay taxes . . . " and
from the trustee's ability to obtain a bar order protecting him against per-
sonal liability. But since Section 47 of the Bankruptcy Act, which relates
to the required duties of the trustee, does not specifically provide for such
8. REv. STAT. §§3466, 3467 (1875), 31 U. S. C. §§ 191, 192 (1934). Taxes due
the United States are "debts" within the meaning of these sections. Price v. United
States, 269 U. S. 492 (1926). The effect of this statute is modified to the extent that
Section 64(b) of the Bankruptcy Act accords priority to other claims ahead of taxes.
United States v. Kaplan, 74 F. (2d) 664 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935).
9. United States v. Clark, 25 Fed. Cas. No. 14,807 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1826); United
States v. Barnes, 31 Fed. 705 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1887); United States v. Eyges, 286
Fed. 683 (D. Mass. 1923). For the meaning of "knowledge," see infra, p. 839.
10. New York v. Irving Trust Co., 288 U. S. 329 (1933), (1933) 1 GEo. WASh.
L. REv. 268 (state claim); In re Anderson, 279 Fed. 525 (C. C.A. 2d, 1922). But
cf. United States v. Elliott, 57 F. (2d) 843 (C.C. A. 6th, 1932), (1933) 46 HAMy.
L. REv. 517. The need for bar orders arises because governments, unlike other creditors,
are not bound to take initiative in submitting and proving claims within the time
specified. Bankruptcy Act § 57(n) ; Villere v. United States, 18 F. (2d) 409 (C. C. A.
5th, 1927); Wechsler v. United States, 27 F. (2d) 850 (C. C. A. 3d, 1928); see 6
REmiNGoN, BANKRUPTCY (4th ed. 1931) § 2808.
11. See Stanard v. Dayton, 220 Fed. 441, 444 (C.C.A. 8th, 1915); In re De
Angeles, 36 F. (2d) 218, 219 (C. C. A. 10th, 1929); In re Kallak, 147 Fed. 276, 277
(D. N. D. 1906) ; In re Montgomery and Son, 17 F. (2d) 404, 406 (N. D. Ohio 1927) ;
In re Servel, 45 F. (2d) 660, 661 (D. Idaho 1930); 2 REmInGToN, BANKRUPTCY (4th
ed. 1931) § 847. But cf. United States v. Eyges, 286 Fed. 683 (D. Mass. 1923).
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a duty, and since a trustee might have difficulty in obtaining a bar order
against taxes of which he has no knowledge, it would seem more reason-
able to adopt the court's theory in the instant case that there is no duty to
discover and pay all tax claims, a theory which has also been used in denying
recovery for federal taxes.
13
Although the trustee is under no duty to discover all taxes, it is clear that
he owes a duty to the creditors to exercise due diligence in administering
the estate.14 Therefore, if the trustee should disregard known tax claims
and distribute the bankrupt's estate to general creditors, he would ordinarily
be personally liable to the taxing body for negligently performing his trustY.
But in most cases a dereliction of duty will not be so easily found, for the
trustee will ordinarily deny that he knew of the unpaid taxes. To overcome
this defense, resort may be had to the doctrine of "constructive" knowledge.
But precisely what constitutes "constructive" knowledge of tax claims is not
dear. It has been said that the trustee is bound to take notice of taxes as-
sessed during the bankruptcy proceedings.10 And it is patent that he should
not be allowed to deny knowledge of tax claims scheduled by the bankrupt.' T
Furthermore, it is arguable that the trustee should be charged with knowledge
of the tax claims which appear on the bankrupt's books, or which are matters
of public record, or which would become known or barred by the issuance
of a bar order. Several dicta have suggested this basis of liability,' 8 and
one case has held the trustee personally liable for failure to collect assets
whose existence was not brought to his knowledge but might have been dis-
covered by searching the bankrupt's books.'9 It might well be argued that
the doctrine should be extended to hold as a matter of law that the trustee,
12. Two difficulties stand in the way of obtaining such an order. First, although
no case holds that bar orders may not be issued in those instances where government
claims are not known to the trustee, they have generally been issued only against
known tax claims. See cases cited supra note 10. Secondly, there is a practical
difficulty in serving notice of a bar order upon every taxdng authority that might pos-
sibly have a claim against the bankrupt.
13. United States v. Eyges, 286 Fed. 683 (D. Mass. 1923) (federal income tax).
14. It is, of course, an elementary principle of trust law that the trustee owes to
his beneficiaries the duty of exercising, at the very least, the skill of a man of ordinary
prudence. Carson, Pirie Scott & Co. v. Turner, 61 F. (2d) 693 (C. C. A. 6th, 1932);
In re Piece Dyeing Co., 89 F. (2d) 37 (C. C.A. 2d, 1937) (receiver pending adjudica-
tion as a bankrupt) ; see In re Montgomery and Son, 17 F. (Zd) 404, 405 (N. D. Ohio
1927); 2 RxmqamNao, BANxRUpTCY (4th ed. 1931) § 1125; REsTATm=Nr, Tnusrs
(1935) § 174.
15. City of Dallas v. Menezes, 16 F. (2d) 779 (C. C.A. 5th, 1927); cf. In re
Montgomery and Son, 17 F. (2d) 404 (N. D. Ohio 1927) (labor claim).
16. In re William F. Fisher & Co., 148 Fed. 907 (D. N. J. 1906) ; cf. United States
v. Eyges, 286 Fed. 683 (D. Mass. 1923).
17. City of Dallas v. Menezes, 16 F. (2d) 779 (C. C. A. Sth, 1927).
18. See In re Anderson, 279 Fed. 525, 529 (C. C. A. 2d, 1922) ; In re Kallak 147
Fed. 276, 277 (D. N. D. 1906) ; In re Milwaukee Sheep and Wool Co., 186 Wis 320,
329, 202 N. W. 693, 696 (1925).
19. In re Kuhn Bros., 234 Fed. 277 (C. C. A. 7th, 1916).
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who might have learned of the existence of the tax claims by inquiry of the
state authorities, had been negligent.
The immunization of the trustee from liability in the instant case does not,
however, deprive the plaintiff of all possibility of collecting the taxes. In
the first place, it may still pursue the bankrupt, since unpaid taxes are not
affected by a discharge in bankruptcy.20 But in view of the fact that the
bankrupt usually does not retain any non-exempt assets, this remedy will
ordinarily be only a nominal one. Secondly, the taxing body may be able
to recover from the general creditors pro rata portions of their distributed
dividends on the theory that they were recipients of funds rightfully belonging
to the taxing body.
2 '
'LIABILITY OF DIRECTORS OF NATIONAL BANK RECEIVING PREFERENTIAL
PAYMENT FROM INSOLVENT CORPORATION*
THE DIRECTORS of a national bank approved a loan to a New York cor-
poration of a sum greater than that permitted by statute. Upon learning of
the borrower's imminent insolvency, the directors demanded reduction of
the indebtedness, and the corporation complied by assigning title to certain
accounts receivable to the bank. Although the borrower retained control
over the accounts, some of the proceeds were paid to the bank from time
to time over a period of five months in reduction of the loan.' The borrower
was then adjudicated a bankrupt, and its trustee brought suit against the
directors and the bank, which had also become insolvent, to recover the pro-
ceeds so paid both as a fraudulent conveyance under the Bankruptcy Act and
20. Bankruptcy Act § 17(1).
21. See City of Dallas v. Menezes, 16 F. (2d) 779 (C. C. A. 5th, 1927); i re
Montgomery and Son, 17 F. (2d) 404, 407 (N. D. Ohio 1927). In both cases, the
bankruptcy proceedings were still in progress. In a prior proceeding in the instant
case, the court refused to reopen the proceedings to require the creditors of the bankrupt
to pay back a portion of their distributed shares. In re American Solvents & Chemical
Corp., 73 F. (2d) 301 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934). Cf. 48 STAT. 748 (1934), 26 U. S. C.
§311 (1934), which provides for a summary proceeding against transferees of a tax-
payer who is unable to meet his tax liabilities.
The taxing authority may also have a claim against the surety on the trustee's
bond. But a showing of negligence would be a pre-requisite to recovery. United States
y. Perkins, 280 Fed. 546 (C. C. A. 8th, 1922); In re Hoyt, 119 Fed. 987 (E. D. N. C.
1903) ; cf. Howard v. United States, 87 F. (2d) 243 (C. C. A. 7th, 1937).
*Duell v. Brewer, 92 F. (2d) 59 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937).
1. The "dominion" retained by the borrower over the assigned accounts was
sufficient to render the assignment fraudulent as against creditors. Benedict v. Ratner,
268 U. S. 353 (1925). The assignment was hence voidable by the trustee and gave
the bank no right either to the proceeds actually paid or to the balance remaining on
the accounts. But the trustee in bankruptcy chose to predicate his case upon the prefer-
ential or fraudulent character of the payments and did not stress the rule of Bencdict
v. Rather, stipra.
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as a voidable preference under the New York Stock Corporation Law. On
motion to dismiss, the lower court found the bank liable on both counts but
dismissed the suit as against the directors. On appeal, the Circuit Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that, since the directors were respon-
sible over to the bank for all damages resulting from the illegal loan, they
had received sufficient benefit from the payments, which had reduced pro
tanto the amount of the bank's claim, and that they should hence be liable
for whatever preferential or fraudulent payments the bankrupt had made.
2
Although directors' liability has apparently never before been considered
under a fact situation like that of the instant case, there can be no doubt that
the principle of indirect benefit, upon which liability was here predicated
a
can be spelled out of each of three pertinent statutory provisions. Section
67e of the Bankruptcy Act provides that the trustee may recover property
transferred by the debtor with intent to hinder, delay or defraud creditors
within four months of the filing of the petition.4 Section 60b of the same
Act provides that a transfer or payment made by an insolvent debtor within
four months of the petition may be avoided by the trustee if " . . . the
person receiving it or to be benefited thereby . . . " had reasonable cause
to believe that the transfer would effect a preference.5 Section 15 of the
New York Stock Corporation Law is substantially identical with 60b
except that it makes no specific reference to the beneficial recipient and
contains no four-month limitation." Because of this latter omission' and
because no proof of fraud is required to establish a preference, this section
affords a more satisfactory basis for liability in the instant case than do
either of the other two. Nor is the absence of any mention of the person
to be benefited by the preference fatal to an action thereunder against the
directors, for it has generally been held that all three statutory provisions
apply to any actual beneficiary as well as to the nominal transferee.8 Thus,
2. Duell v. Brewer, 92 F. (2d) 59 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937).
3. The fact that the beneficial recipients were directors and hence agents of the
bank would seem to be immaterial. Duell v. Brewer, 92 F. (2d) 59 (C. C.A. 2d, 1937).
But cf. Carson v. Federal Reserve Bank, 254 N. Y. 218, 172 N. E. 475 (1930).
4. The liability provided by this section is absolute except as against "purchasers
in good faith and for a present fair consideration." In view of the allegations of the
complaint neither the bank nor the directors would seem to fall within this class. There
might, however, be some difficulty in proving intent to defraud. Cf. Coder v. Arts,
213 U. S. 223 (1909).
5. 36 STAT. 842 (1910), 11 U.S.C. §96 (1934).
6. Since a trustee in bankruptcy takes all the rights of the creditors, he may avoid
any transfer which a creditor had the power to set aside and may thus utilize state laws.
7. Since the payments from the accounts extended over a period of five months
preceding bankruptcy, reliance on Sections 60b or 67d of the Bankruptcy Act, would
limit the trustee's recovery to those payments made within the last four months. See
notes 4 and 5, supra.
8. Kobusch v. Hand, 156 Fed. 660 (C. C. A. 8th, 1907) ; Walters v. Zimmerman,
208 Fed. 62 (N. D. Ohio 1913) ; Goldman v. Cohen, 261 Fed. 672 (C. C. A. 1st, 1919) ;
Landry v. Andrews, 22 R. I. 597, 48 At. 1036 (1901) ; cf. Roberts v. Johnson, 151 Fed.
567 (C. C.A. 4th, 1907); see National Bank of Newport v. Herldmer Bank, 225 U. S.
178, 184 (1912); GiLBERT's CoLniE oN BANKRUPTCY (4th ed. 1937) 886.
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if a preferential or fraudulent payment of a debt owed by A to B is made
at B's request to B's creditor C, B having received an indirect benefit is
liable to A's trustee in bankruptcy just as if payment had been made directly
to him.9 Of course C's benefit is obvious, and, provided he knowingly in-
duced and received the preference or fraudulent transfer, he too would be
liable.' 0
Since all the directors in the principal case were alleged to have had the
requisite knowledge regarding the borrower's precarious financial condition"
and the nature of the transfer, their liability under Section 15 was clear
upon a showing that they benefited from the payments to the bank. To
determine the existence of such a benefit, it is necessary to refer to pertinent
provisions of the National Banking Act. These forbid loans to any one
corporation beyond an amount equal to 10% of the bank's surplus and paid
in capital stock 12 and provide that directors who knowingly participate in
or assent to a violation of this restriction shall be personally responsible for
all damages suffered by the bank in consequence of the violation.'3 Although
it seems reasonably certain that the liability contemplated by this statute
extends to the net loss to the bank resulting from the illegal loan, 14 there is
9. See cases cited note 8, supra.
10. At common law, the recipient of a fraudulent transfer was not liable to the
debtor's creditors unless a lien had been impressed upon the property prior to the con-
veyance. Adler v. Fenton, 24 How. 407 (U. S. 1860); Lamb v. Stone, 28 Mass. 526
(1831); (1918) 18 CoL L. REv. 363.
11. The liability under Section 67e is broader than that of Section 60b, for
-under the former provision a fraudulent intent by the debtor is sufficient cause for setting
aside the transfer, whereas under the latter the recipient must have reasonable cause
to believe that a preference would result. But the difficulty in proving fraudulent
intent on the part of the bankrupt counteracts this benefit. Compare Van Iderstine
v. National Discount Co., 227 U. S. 575 (1913), with Dean v. Davis, 242 U. S. 438
(1916) ; Comment (1933) 28 ILL. L. Rxv. 103. Assets of the bankrupt must be depleted
before a preference is created. First Nat. Bank of Danville v. Phalen, 62 F. (2d)
21 (C.C.A. 7th, 1932).
The Chandler Bill proposes to include the salient features of the Uniform Fraudulent
Conveyance Act. H. R. REp. No. 8046, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937).
12. 34 STAT. 451 (1906), 12 U. S. C. § 84 (1934). A borrower of an excessive loan
cannot escape repayment on the ground that the advance was void. Shoemaker v.
National Mechanics' Bank, 21 Fed. Cas. No. 12,801 (C. C. D. Md. 1869); People
ex rel. Nelson v. First State Bank of Barrington, 274 Ill. App. 46 (1934) ; 7 ZoLLMA,
BANKS AND BANKING (1936) § 4844.
13. 36 STAT. 1167 (1911), 12 U. S. C. §93 (1934).
14. Corsicana Nat Bank v. Johnson, 251 U. S. 68 (1919); Gamble v. Brown,
29 F. (2d) 366 (C. C. A. 4th, 1928) ; McRoberts v. Spaulding, 32 F. (2d) 315 (S. D.
Iowa 1929); McQueen v. First Nat. Bank of Mesa City, 36 Ariz. 74, 283 Pac. 273
(1929). The rationale of these decisions has been that the borrower would not have
accepted a lesser amount. The directors may, however, escape from this proposition
by authorizing two loans, one for the statutory limit, and a second for an additional
sum, and thus confine their liability to the second loan only. See McRoberts v. Spauld-
ing, 32 F. (2d) 315, 318 (S. D. Iowa 1929).
A small minority of courts have held that the liability of the directors extends only
to the illegal portion of the loan. Witters v. Sowles, 43 Fed. 405 (C. C. D. Vt, 1890) ;
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some doubt as to how and when such liability accrues.'6 The divergence of
opinion on this point, however, can have no important bearing upon the
decision of the principal case. If liability is considered to vest upon making
the loan,' 6 the directors received immediate benefit from the preferential
payments, since their existing responsibility to the bank was reduced by the
amount of the payments made. And even though liability were contingent
upon the failure of the bank to recover the full amount of the loan,17 the
amount of the directors' liability would be determined in the same way. In
either case the benefit is obvious, and whether it is conditional or uncon-
ditional seems of little significance.'"
Nor does the decision in the instant case result in any hardship to the
directors, for in no respect does it increase their ultimate liability for the
illegal loan-namely the original amount of the bank's claim, less any divi-
dends on that amount obtainable from the borrower's bankrupt estate.10 In
determining what the rights of the directors in the instant case will be im-
mediately following the foregoing decision, the distinction between absolute
and contingent liability is largely a matter of procedure, for whatever course
the bank is forced to adopt, the result as to the directors will be the same.
If the bank's realization of a deficiency on the loan is a condition of the
director's liability, its recovery against the directors would be limited to the
full amount of the claim less the dividend on that amount obtainable from
the bankrupt estate. And since the directors will have already paid the
amount of the preferential transfer in full, the total extent of their liability
will remain unchanged.2 0 If, on the other hand, the directors first pay off
Rankin v. Cooper, 149 Fed. 1010 (C. C. W. D. Ark. 1907). But in view of the wording
of the statute, this interpretation cannot be taken seriously.
15. See cases cited notes 16 and 17, infra.
16. Adams v. Clarke, 22 F. (2d) 957 (C. C. A. 9th, 1927) ; Anderson v. Akers, 7 F.
Supp. 924 (W. D. Ky. 1934); see Corsicana Nat. Bank v. Johnson, 251 U. S. 69, 87
(1919). Under this rule the Statute of Limitations runs from the making of the loan
and directors who retain control may thus escape responsibility. Anderson v. Gailey,
33 F. (2d) 589 (N. D. Ga. 1929); Hughes v. Reed, 46 F. (2d) 435 (C C A. 10th,
1931); Payne v. Ostrus, 50 F. (2d) 1039 (C. C. A. 8th, 1931); cf. Purcell v. Baker,
110 S. IV. (2d) 1079 (1937).
17. Schilling v. Parman, 35 F. (2d) 780 (D. Ore. 1928); Emerson v. Gaither,
103 Md. 564, 64 AtL. 26 (1906).
18. Cf. cases cited note 8, supra. These cases seem to imply that any "benefit" is
sufficient. The only situation in which the directors would receive no benefit whatsoever
would be when the assets of the bankrupt are sufficient to pay the entire amount of the
loan. This possibility is so remote, however, that it does not warrant serious considera-
tion. See Comment (1937) 46 YAm L. 3. 1177.
19. See note 13, supra.
20. Section 57i of the Bankruptcy Act provides that if any creditor fails to prove
his claim in the bankruptcy proceedings, his surety may do so in the creditor's name
and may then be subrogated to the extent that he has satisfied the claim. The liability
of the directors in the instant case is closely analogous to that of a surety on the loan.
In any event they will have paid the debt under compulsion, and their right to subroga-
tion will be clear. See General Order 21 (4); McLaughlin, Amendmwnt of Ith Ban-
ruptcy Act (1927) 40 Htav. L. REv. 585. Cf. Smith v. Tostevin, 247 Fed. 102 (C. C. A.
2d, 1917); Svrarts v. Siegel, 117 Fed. 13 (C. C.A. 8th, 1902).
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the borrower's indebtedness in full, they will be subrogated to all the rights
of the bank and they may hence file a claim in the creditor's name for the
entire loan.21
The only difficulty which the directors may encounter in establishing their
claims against the bankrupt centers around the statutory restrictions on proof
of claims in bankruptcy. It is clear that neither the directors nor the bank
may recover any dividends from the trustee until the preferential payments
have been surrendered in full.22 But even though the directors satisfy the
judgment secured by the trustee in the instant case, and hence obviate the
difficulty of the preferential payment, they must be careful to avoid the
limitations of Section 57n. This Section of the Bankruptcy Act provides
that no claim may be filed more than six months after adjudication unless
it is liquidated by litigation and the final judgment therein is rendered
within "thirty days before or after the expiration of such time." On its
face, this provision seems to bar the filing of any new claim either by the
directors or by the bank following the decision in the instant case, since the
litigation was not terminated until five years after the borrower's adjudication.
Actually, however, the courts have adopted a liberal interpretation of this
section of the Act. It is well settled that litigation over a preference comes
within the meaning of the clause.23 Moreover, the courts have refused to
restrict the scope of the provision to judgments rendered within thirty days
of the termination of the six months period simply by construing the
words "such time" in Section 57n as modifying the word "litigation"
rather than the phrase "six months after adjudication." 24 The result of this
interpretation is that where the directors are responsible to the bank for the
full amount of the loan, they may file and prove their claim for that amount
21. See note 20, supra.
22. See Section 57g of the Bankruptcy Act. It seems that satisfaction of a judg-
ment secured by the trustee constitutes a "surrender" within the meaning of the section.
Keppel v. Tiffin Savings Bank, 197 U. S. 356 (1904).
23. Page v. Rogers, 211 U. S. 575 (1909); In re Roeber, 127 Fed. 122 (C, C. A,
2d, 1903); it re John A. Baker Notion Co., 180 Fed. 922 (S. D. N. Y. 1910).
24. Although this interpretation seems strained it has generally been accepted by
the courts. Page v. Rogers, 211 U. S. 575 (1909) ; Larson v. First State Bank, 21 F.
(2d) 936 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927). It seems that after the preference has been set aside, the
claim may be filed for the first time. In re Salvation Brewing Co., 188 Fed. 522 (S. D.
N. Y. 1911).
The Chandler Bill [H. R. REP. No. 8046, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937)] codifies
the existing law on this subject and provides that the six months limitation shall not
apply to a " . . . claim arising in favor of a person by reason of the recovery by the
trustee from such person of money or property, or the avoidance by the trustee of a
lien held by such person, may be filed within thirty days from the date of such recovery
or avoidance . . . "
A possible objection to this codification may arise from the fact that it tends to
encourage the retention of preferences. A creditor may refuse to file a claim at the
outset of the proceeding because he prefers to retain a preferential payment which is
larger than the expected dividend. If the trustee sues for the preference, the creditor




even though the bank had not previously filed in the bankruptcy court.2 5
But, in filing their claim, the directors would probably have to pay up the
balance of their obligation to the bank within sixty days rather than wait
to be sued in order to come within the limitation of Section 57n. Similarly,
where their liability is contingent, they should see that the bank files within
the statutory period; if it fails to do so, they should themselves file in the
bank's name under Section 57i.
25. If the bank filed proof of claim immediately after the borrower's adjudication,
the directors would not, of course, have to file again. In re Heyman, 95 Fed. 800
(S. D. N. Y. 1899); Matter of Hanson and Tyler Auto Co., 286 Fed. 161 (N. D.
Iowa 1922); ARNoLD, SuaErYsHnp AND GunAnrAIT (1927) 243. In that event they
would be subrogated to the right of the bank to whatever dividends were forthcoming.
